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ABSTRACT 
  This thesis examines America’s response to civil war, dispossession, and humanitarian 
disaster in Sudan from the end of the Cold War up until the second Darfur uprising.  While the 
number of scholarly works examining the overall conflict and humanitarian crisis are immense, 
less has been written in regard to America’s foreign policy in Sudan. The contemporary nature of 
the crisis and dearth of historical analysis does make establishing trends difficult; but recent 
works suggest a U.S. policy that is ill informed and therefore ineffectual in halting both the 
conflict and crisis in Sudan.  However, contrary to this opinion, the evidence may demonstrate 
that United States policy, rather than a series of misjudgments or being simply ineffectual, has 
been more systematic, informed and purposeful. This thesis argues that while the United States 
wished for peace in Sudan, the historical evidence suggests that the path taken by the United 
States knowingly prolonged the suffering of millions of Sudanese. Furthermore, American policy 
makers have entrusted peace in Darfur and in other disparate regions of Sudan, as well as along 
the newly formed borders with South Sudan, to the National Congress Party (NCP) a regime 
Congress has labeled untrustworthy and despotic.  
The bulk of the research used in this examination covered the period from 1989- 2008. 
However, the independence achieved by the Republic of South Sudan in the summer of 2011 is 
taken into account in the final analysis of the thesis. The secondary sources both cited and 
considered for the thesis were substantial; these included academic articles, studies, and texts 
published over several decades in several related fields of study germane to the thesis topic. 
While a wide range of primary sources were used, the thesis relied heavily on United States 
Congressional records from 1989-2008 for analysis.   
  
iv 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
I dedicate this thesis to my son Noah. May he be a harbinger of peace.      
  
v 
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 
 It is a pleasure to thank those who made this thesis possible. First, I would like to thank 
my wife Zinthia who has given support, both academic, and in the form of constant 
encouragement. Thanks too for putting up with me through this long and arduous process. I am 
also grateful for the support and understanding of my friends and family. While work on my 
thesis limited my time with you, you were always in my thoughts. 
This thesis would not have been possible without the great knowledge and assistance I 
was able to acquire from all the wonderful professors at the University of Central Florida—most 
of all Dr. Ezekiel Walker who oversaw the process of writing this thesis and gave constant 
direction. Lastly, I am grateful to the number of individuals that read drafts of my thesis—at 
various stages of its completion—and were able to provide advice or comments. The feedback 
was helpful throughout the process.   
  
  
vi 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS ....................................................................................................... vii 
CHAPTER ONE: AMERICA’S RESPONSE TO THE CONFLICT AND REFUGEE CRISIS IN 
SUDAN ............................................................................................................................... 1 
CHAPTER TWO: THE HISTORY OF CONFLICT AND DISPOSSESSION IN SUDAN ....... 22 
CHAPTER THREE: THE US RESPONSE TO THE CONFLICT IN SUDAN: A 
CONVENIENT PEACE ................................................................................................... 44 
CHAPTER FOUR: AMERICA’S RESPONSE TO THE REFUGEE CRISIS IN SUDAN: THE 
FAILURE OF HUMANITARIANISM AND DECLINE OF AMERICAN ASYLUM .. 84 
CHAPTER FIVE: AFTERWORD ............................................................................................. 109 
ENDNOTES ............................................................................................................................... 123 
 
  
vii 
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS  
AMIS     African Mission in Sudan 
AU     African Union  
CPA     Comprehensive Peace Agreement  
DUP     Democratic Unionist party  
GNU     Government of National Unity  
GOS     Government of Sudan  
GoSS     Government of South Sudan  
ICC     International Criminal Court  
ICG     International Crisis Group  
IGAD     The Intergovernmental Authority for Development   
JEM     Justice and Equality Movement  
NCP     National Congress Party  
NDA     National Democratic Alliance  
NIF     National Islamic Front  
OLS     Operation Lifeline Sudan  
PCP     People’s Congress Party  
SAF     Sudan Armed Forces  
SLA/M    Sudan Liberation Movement/Army  
SPLA/M    Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army  
UN     United Nations   
UNAMID    African/United Nations Hybrid operation in Darfur 
UNMIS    United Nations Mission in Sudan  
viii 
UNHCR    United Nations High Commission for Refugees  
UNSC     United Nations Security Council 
  
1 
CHAPTER ONE: AMERICA’S RESPONSE TO THE CONFLICT AND REFUGEE 
CRISIS IN SUDAN  
Sudan’s Civil War, which began in 1956, has been perhaps the world’s most pressing 
geopolitical dilemma. Prior to the new millennium, the conflict and the humanitarian crisis were 
only intermittingly halted by a respite of ten years brought about by the Addis Ababa peace 
agreement in 1972. The conflict then renewed with horrific intensity in 1983.  Since then over 
two million people have died.
1
 Further, millions have been forced to flee their homes. On the 
surface the conflict involved rebels from the South fighting against various hegemonic Sudanese 
governments operating from Khartoum, which then expanded in 2002-2003 to the Western 
region of Darfur, threatening the supposed peace process (for those who put any stock in it) that 
had been underway between the Sudanese government and the Southern rebels. The peace 
process began the previous year and was to lead to the historic Comprehensive Peace Agreement 
(CPA) which was finalized in 2005. An important piece to the CPA was the 2011 referendum to 
decide whether the South would remain part of a united Sudan or separate.  
The South, choosing the latter path, formed the newly independent Republic of South 
Sudan on July 9, 2011. While this momentous event has given much reason for encouragement, 
many of the fundamental issues that plagued the two disparate regions, now two separate nations, 
remain unresolved. Dispossession and humanitarian disaster, both directly tied to the policies of 
the Sudanese government, continue to plague Sudan and South Sudan.  In January, 2011, there 
were still an estimated 4.3 million Internally Displaced Persons
*
 (IDPs) in Sudan. While many of 
these unfortunate persons presently languish within the borders of Sudan or South Sudan, 
                                                 
* The Internal Displacement Monitoring Center estimated as of January 2011 that there were still 5 million 
internally displaced persons in Sudan.  The UNHCR uses a lower figure of 4.3 million. (Both these figures include 
the region of southern Sudan that currently is the Republic of South Sudan.) 
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millions more continue to suffer outside the borders of their homeland as refugees.   
Additionally, in May, 2011, only months before the 2011 referendum, Northern forces seized the 
contested strategic oil-rich region of Abyei. The Seizure of Abyei, which was labeled by 
Southerners as an “act of war,”2 has led to violent clashes and thousands fleeing Abyei after the 
July independence of South Sudan.   
The crisis in Sudan has long been the topic of considerable scholarly interest. There have 
been countless scholarly works that point to the government in Khartoum as the cause for the 
inherent inequities in the Sudanese State as well as the impetus behind the history of conflict and 
dispossession. While the number of scholarly works examining the overall conflict and 
humanitarian crisis are immense, less has been written in regard to America’s foreign policy in 
Sudan. Contemporary scholars, including Peter W. Klein, author of “Tea and Sympathy: The 
United States and the Sudan Civil War, 1985-2005,” reasoned that while U.S. policy may be 
misguided at times and ineffectual, “the U.S. goal remains ending the war.”3 However, contrary 
to this opinion, evidence may demonstrate that United States policy, rather than a series of 
misjudgments or being ineffectual, has been more systematic, informed and purposeful. 
This thesis argues that while the United States wished for peace in Sudan, historical 
evidence suggests that the path taken by the United States knowingly prolonged the suffering of 
millions of Sudanese. Furthermore, American policy makers have entrusted peace in Darfur and 
in other disparate regions of Sudan, as well as along the newly formed borders with South Sudan, 
to the National Congress Party (NCP) a regime Congress has labeled untrustworthy and despotic. 
Under successive regimes, beginning in the late 1980s up until the latter half of the last decade 
the United States has systematically supported policy in Sudan that it knew would not end the 
crisis or suffering there. While each American administration had varying global concerns, all 
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had in common the view that the crisis in Sudan was not geopolitically important enough to 
warrant significant American resources.  Additionally, post-9/11, under George W. Bush, 
America geared its policy toward the war on terror further deemphasizing the crisis in Sudan; 
this path has led to a relative détente with the NCP and a significant decrease in the number of 
asylum cases accepted into the United States from Africa.   
Although the crisis in Sudan was marginalized by policy makers, it did receive attention.   
Foremost among American initiatives were the Comprehensive Peace Agreement and 
humanitarianism. Both of these initiatives required the good faith of the government in 
Khartoum. American efforts also included sanctions which have had little effect on the crisis. 
The United States for more than two decades was fully informed by its own members of 
Congress, a host of scholarly experts, and personnel on the ground that Khartoum continued to 
manipulate both Humanitarian efforts and the peace process in order to continue its hegemonic 
practices in Sudan. Additionally, the most recent trend in the scholarly work, a view also 
expressed in Congress, questions the very nature of humanitarianism, suggesting humanitarian 
efforts are politically expedient but do little to address root causes of conflict. 
While the 2005 CPA officially ended Sudan’s civil war, violence, displacement, and the 
suffering of thousands has continued almost unabated. In fact, the second outbreak of violence in 
Darfur in 2006 (labeled genocide by Colin Powell and the UN) seemed to bring the level of 
violence to new heights and make a mockery of Khartoum’s promises as well as the principles 
lauded in the CPA. While the CPA provided language for power sharing, elections, and wealth 
sharing between North and South, the United States did little in terms of resources and in 
personnel to ensure for the security and integrity of these arrangements. 
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 In the years leading up to the South’s independence, fundamental to the CPA succeeding 
was the cooperation of the government in Khartoum. However, the historical record clearly 
demonstrates that the National Congress Party consistently violated the major stipulations of the 
CPA. Additionally, and significant to this thesis, is that the evidence shows the United States was 
not taken unaware by the National Congress Party’s treachery but expected it. Although the 
United States’ support of the CPA—and its 2011 referendum—has led most recently to the 
South’s independence, the wait has come at a terrible cost as hundreds of thousands have died or 
been displaced since 2005.  
The independence of the South should be celebrated on some level; it is questionable if 
North and South could co-exist in wake of their history.  However, issues with U.S. policy and 
the inherent nature of politics in the North still raise serious doubts about future peace in the 
region.  Foremost of these issues are that the CPA simplified the crisis and severely weakened 
the integrity of future peace by reducing the signatories of the CPA to the National Congress 
Party and the Sudanese People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM). Sudan’s tragic history is 
perhaps most deeply connected to the lack of voice afforded the disparate groups in Sudan.  The 
newly formed South Sudan’s government is dominated by the SPLM. Challenges to the Dinka- 
controlled SPLM in the South have historic roots tied to the civil war and will continue to 
present difficulties for the new nation. In August, 2011 a report indicated both random banditry 
and the SPLA killing of 200 innocent civilians in the Unity State (Bentiu) in South Sudan.
4
 At 
stake is 90 percent of South Sudan’s oil production and perhaps more importantly the viability of 
a State formed from the limited CPA.  However, more troubling is that the CPA and America’s 
present policy have not altered, but have encouraged the National Congress Party’s hegemonic 
practices in Sudan and its belligerent policies toward key strategic border regions with South 
5 
Sudan. In addition to violence along the border with South Sudan, violence has recently flared up 
in the Nuba Mountains and the Blue Nile Region. The people of these two regions, left out of the 
referendum that resulted in the South’s independence, fear that they will once again be targeted 
by Khartoum for extinction. In May, 2011 President al Bashir commented, “We will force them 
[the people of the Juba Mts.] back into the mountains.”5 Why then would the United States 
pursue a path (absent the good faith of Khartoum) that had so little chance of success and is 
prolonging the crisis?   
While it seems an obvious supposition for a historian to start with, what motivates a 
nation to act is often confused with the rhetoric that accompanies its stated policy. American 
policy has not always been a success in terms of its stated goal in Sudan, i.e. ending the crisis.  
However, the path taken in Sudan allowed the United States to devote the bulk of its resources, 
diplomatic, military, and monetary to regions of the world it deemed more strategically 
important than Sudan. In this regard America’s overall foreign policy –which aimed to keep the 
crisis in Sudan on the periphery, was consistent and successful.  
This thesis covers the period from the late 1980s up until 2008,
†
 which began the dawn of 
the post-Cold War era and saw three different U.S. administrations. During this time the crisis in 
Sudan had become under the National Islamic Front (NIF),
‡
 which seized power in a 1989 coup, 
an even more appalling tragedy as the NIF moved toward a total war “win at all costs” agenda. 
Throughout this period, several factors including American ascendancy at the end of the Cold 
War, gave the United States the unfettered ability to act diplomatically, even militarily 
                                                 
†
 While the bulk of the research for this thesis was done prior to the 2011 independence of South Sudan and covers 
in detail the events up until the second uprising in Darfur, the writer has incorporated the current reality of the 
South’s independence into the text.  
‡
 The NIF officially became known as the National Congress Party (NCP) in 1998.  
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throughout the world. Although the United States used this latitude to aggressively pursue 
foreign policy in areas or matters it deemed strategically important, its policy toward the crisis in 
Sudan was to remain detached. Again, while on the surface it alleged to pursue peace in Sudan, 
the United States had little faith in either the peace process or humanitarianism. However, these 
policies did allow America to maximize and channel its resources more strategically. The United 
States ironically, but consistent with this view, took forceful or proactive measures in Sudan, but 
not to end the Sudanese crisis. For example, the American 1998 missile attack on a 
pharmaceutical plant in Khartoum was in response to its alleged connection to Osama bin Laden 
and the production of chemical weapons. While the American attack was often couched in 
language by the Clinton administration highlighting the NIF’s poor human rights record, it did 
nothing to mitigate the consequences of the war or humanitarian crisis.  The threat of terrorism 
post-9/11 also compelled the Bush White House to intensify its diplomatic activity in Khartoum. 
While the Bush administration used strong language to imply that the level of interest in Sudan 
was also intended to rein in the Government of Sudan (GOS) and bring a halt to the war and 
humanitarian crisis, the evidence suggests otherwise. This thesis asserts that the post-9/11 
relationship with the NCP—begun under the George W. Bush administration—has been 
damaging to the long term stability of Sudan, now the Republic of Sudan and the Republic of 
South Sudan.  First, the relative détente between the United States and the NCP, although 
possibly allowing the U.S. to acquire useful counter-terrorism intelligence, has not compelled the 
NCP to change its hegemonic practices and has in effect legitimized this rogue regime.  
Additionally, in the one area American humanitarian efforts might make a positive change -
asylum grants- numbers fell to an all-time low under President George W. Bush. 
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Analyzing the American response to the Sudanese crisis requires a deeper investigation 
of the catastrophic displacement crisis in Sudan. Again, the number of scholarly works 
investigating displacement and the subsequent humanitarian disaster in Sudan are immense. 
Although these works do have a varied focus, namely economics, slavery, and state construction, 
all directly connect displacement with the policies of the government in Khartoum. The 
inexorable link between the conflict and displacement crisis as well as the humanitarian disaster 
in Sudan, has dictated U.S. policy, and scholars take both into account. Once more, United States 
policy makers were not ill informed of this connection. A substantial number of respected 
scholars have sat on Congressional committees, most notably John Prendergast and Roger 
Winter, and many more have testified before Congress detailing this relationship.  
Of the millions displaced in Sudan, most of these unfortunate individuals never reached a 
safe haven or refuge within Sudan or even across its border. By 2007, the conflict in Darfur had 
killed 200,000- 400,000 people, an estimated 75% were the sad result of displacement, 
malnutrition, disease, and starvation. 
6
 Of those displaced in Sudan fortunate enough to survive, 
their prospects for asylum was slight at best. By 2007, it was estimated that half of all the 
world’s refugees lived in camps in protracted situations.7 Additionally, reflecting a worldwide 
trend of those displaced within Sudan, over 5 million were considered internally displaced 
persons (IDPs) and were not afforded the same protections as refugees. By definition, a displaced 
person has to cross an international border to receive the protections of the UN Mandate. The 
death rate of internally displaced persons is sixty times that of non-displaced persons in the same 
country.
8
   
The proliferation of IDPs in Sudan began with the resumption of conflict in 1983 and 
continued into the 1990’s after the end of the Cold War.  The decade of the 1990s coincided with 
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a worldwide upsurge in both civil strife and community based conflicts around the world, as well 
as an overall rise in the number of IDPs. Sudan’s crisis has mirrored this trend.  Many scholars 
and policy makers have argued America’s global ascendancy, Post-Cold War has opened up new 
opportunities for the United States to intervene more aggressively in nations like the Sudan in 
which millions suffer at the hands of their own despotic governments.  However, while this 
theory has held true in a few instances, America, despite the suffering of millions in Sudan and 
the known transgressions of the Sudanese government, did not choose to intervene more 
forcefully in an attempt to mitigate the crisis. Instead, the overwhelming trend internationally, a 
paradigm shift evident in America’s dealings with the Sudanese crisis, has been for Western 
nations to deal with crisis and conflict in the Third World through humanitarian endeavors. 
Consequently the scholarly fields of humanitarianism and refugee studies are relevant to this 
particular study. The literature (and legal framework) on the humanitarian response to the 
refugee problem followed the devastation and refugee crisis after World War II.  
Louise W. Holborn’s seminal work, Refugees: A Problem of Our Time. The Work of the 
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, 1951 -1972 essentially developed a standard 
that all others have since followed. Holborn, in an expansive two-volume text establishes the 
inherently political nature that sits at the root of the UN mandate. The United Nations High 
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) must appeal to state actors for funds to satisfy the often 
contradictory roles of protecting refugees while still satisfying the unique political whims of 
donor nations. Additionally, the mandate was created to deal with the refugee crisis that afflicted 
post-World War Two Europe. Holborn, writing in 1975, was prescient enough to gauge that the 
political challenges of aiding refugees as the displacement trend has moved from Europe to the 
Third World would become more complex. The scholarly works that followed Holborn are an 
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attempt to address the political nature of the United Nations [refugee] mandate as well as the 
changing face of the international “refugee” crisis.  
A host of authors, including Jeffrey Crisp, capture the political and problematic nature 
(especially post- 1980s) of trying to aid displaced persons. In short, the goals of donor nations 
like the United States are often at cross purposes with the goals of host African nations. Crisp, 
author of “Mind the Gap! UNHCR, Humanitarian Assistance and the Development Process,” 
claim that after the Cold War the Western nations have pulled back their funding for long- term 
economic development and crisis resolution, instead choosing to implement short-term 
humanitarian aid while pushing for repatriation or integration of refugees back into their host 
African nations.   
Paralleling this increased move toward humanitarian initiatives by the United States in 
the 1980s and 1990s has been a scholarly interest in the field of humanitarianism. The works 
have become increasingly critical of humanitarianism, while also questioning the political 
motivations of Western nations. Among the more influential works on these issues, several 
authors stand out. W.R. Smyser, in The Humanitarian Conscience: Caring for Others in the Age 
of Terror, comments that “humanitarian aid has expanded worldwide” while the West is “less 
inclined to spend money and true effort” to address the underlying causes of displacement.9 
Alison Parker and Cecil Dubernet suggest that the political expediency that accompanies 
humanitarianism has led Western actors to prevent the exodus across international borders and 
support the confinement of displaced persons to aid-dependent camps, thus allaying the need for 
long- term and meaningful diplomacy and serious efforts at conflict resolution, the basic cause of 
such displacement. 
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David Kennedy, author of The Dark Sides of Virtue: Reassessing International 
Humanitarianism claims that not only is humanitarianism a politically expedient policy for 
Western actors, but may also be used by rogue regimes, like the Sudanese government (GOS) to 
legitimize their rule through the ratifying of ineffectual human rights laws.  Thomas G. Weiss 
and Cindy Collins, authors of Humanitarian Challenges and Intervention, suggest that 
humanitarian assistance allows the United States to “appease a public that morally demands it.”10 
A new trend in this historiography, led by Alex de Waal, surprisingly suggests that humanitarian 
relief should be abandoned all together. De Waal claims that an affected population should be 
forced, by the denial of aid, to reach a point of “sufficient desperation” where it might fully rise 
up (or be forced) to oppose a despotic government like GOS. 
11
 
Among recent works in the field, two stand out. Not only do the authors suggest there are 
inherent negatives with aid—to the point it should be abandoned—but suggest alternatives to the 
current international trend. First, William Easterly, author of The White Man’s Burden: Why the 
West’s Efforts to Aid the Rest Have Done so Much Ill and So Little Good, published in 2006, 
takes a neo-colonial view, describing the West in paternalistic terms. The West, according to 
Easterly, seeks through aid a panacea that will lift up the blighted and backward Third World.  
Easterly argues further that Western aid is driven from a top down bureaucratic approach. 
Further, aid, and the principles behind its dispersal, are broad sweeping and arranged according 
to scholarly theory. Easterly’s answer is for the West to stick to what it can do, like providing 
vaccines or medicines. Development should be homegrown and be led by social entrepreneurs at 
a grass roots level.  In short, there is no panacea, at least none that the West can provide.   
Dambisa Moyo, author of Dead Aid: Why Aid is Not Working and How There is a Better 
Way, manages, even more so than Easterly, to shake up the orthodoxy.  Moyo, her work 
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published in 2009, suggests that aid has not only failed, but actually has worsened Africa’s 
problems, crippling the ability of African governments to work efficiently. Aid, according to 
Moyo, does not foster good governance—in fact quite the opposite. Moyo suggests if aid was 
cut, African governments would work through private banks and financial institutions to borrow, 
inspiring a trend of responsibility and transparency within Africa’s political systems.  If Moyo’s 
approach is overly optimistic, it does bring to light at least a need for aid agencies, whether 
private or through state actors, to hold governments accountable.  Perhaps aid should look more 
like a loan process in which a bank scrutinizes each client thoroughly.   
Lastly and  relevant to America’s initiatives in Sudan as well as harkening back to 
Holborn’s prescience in her seminal 1974 work, the current historiography has tackled the 
changing nature of displacement.   By the 1990s, most of the displaced persons around the world 
were IDPs. Sudan experienced the largest number at over 4 million.
12
 Consequently, many 
scholars have addressed the United States’ position toward Sudan’s crisis most often from a 
legalistic standpoint.  Judy Mayotte, author of Civil War in Sudan: The Paradox of Human 
Rights and National Sovereignty, states that the historical and legal precedent to protect IDPs 
more forcefully (previously merely a humanitarian issue) was set by the United States during the 
1991 Gulf War. American intervention was justified under UN Security Council Resolution 688, 
when President Bush claimed Iraq’s treatment of its Kurdish population created a threat to 
international peace. Contrary to Mayotte’s argument, scholars like Cohen and Deng, authors of 
Masses in Flight and the Forsaken People, while agreeing that IDPs needed protection, believe 
that international law needs to be examined to close the gaps in the law so IDPs receive the same 
protections that are offered refugees.   
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Mayotte’s insistence on the Gulf War as a legal precedent for more forceful intervention 
(regardless of sovereignty) to protect IDPs is telling for perhaps different reasons than she 
intended.  Evident in Iraq and numerous other American interventions, but lacking in Sudan in 
the last two decades, has been not international law or precedent, but rather the desire or self-
interest of American policy makers to affect greater change in Sudan. The United States enjoyed 
world ascendancy that has ironically paralleled the abject failure of the Sudanese state since its 
independence.  Such influence or dominance, especially post the Cold War, absent the fear of 
catastrophic nuclear war, gave America the unfettered ability to act diplomatically, even 
militarily, throughout the world. American actions were often unilateral and at odds with 
international law, as well as the views of the UN and American allies. However, the 
commonality in its foreign policy was that the U.S. acted aggressively (i.e. with abundant 
diplomatic, material, and military resources), when it deemed it in its own self-interest to do so. 
Once more while the United States may have wished for peace in Sudan, and while its leaders 
strongly denounced the Sudanese government, U.S. policymakers did not believe its path would 
affect positive change in Sudan. American rhetoric and the principal initiative in Sudan, the 
Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA), tended to obscure the true motivations of American 
policy.  
The United States, without providing the necessary resources to enforce the tenuous and 
volatile agreement in Sudan, left the CPA’s enforcement almost entirely up to the current 
Sudanese government, the National Congress Party (NCP).  In the meantime the United States 
was fully aware that NCP would not faithfully enforce the Comprehensive Peace Agreement.  
The NCP took advantage of the relative lull the CPA provided to crush the rebellion in Darfur 
and to secure its position in strategic border areas with the South. Further, instead of pressuring 
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the NCP to modify its position, a regime unpopular in Sudan, as well as internationally, U.S. 
policy bolstered the NCPs position; in effect this legitimized the Sudanese Government allowing 
it to carry on unimpeded as it pursued its hegemonic practices. Although South Sudan has 
secured its independence, the continued transgressions of Khartoum, coupled with the lack of 
American interest and presence in the region, make certain that violence will continue along the 
North/South border. Additionally, unresolved conflicts in Darfur and the Nuba Mountains 
underscore the lack of credibility Khartoum has within its own borders to abide by the principles 
of peace process.    
When the conflict was renewed in 1983, ending the crisis in Sudan never received the full 
weight of America’s resources or diplomatic energy. However, The War on Terror has placed a 
new strategic importance on Sudan, garnering more attention from American policy makers.  
While the CPA inherently required a level of cooperation among the two governments, new 
global strategic concerns post-9/11 created a relative détente between the U.S. and the NCP.  The 
level of cooperation between the two governments had the potential, especially in terms of 
America’s asylum policy to affect positive change in the Sudan.  However, U.S. refugee and 
asylum numbers following 9-11 hit all-time lows. Additionally, America supported the 
repatriation of refugees from bordering countries, back to Sudan, under the banner and spirit or 
the Comprehensive Peace Agreement. Should the commitment to halting the threat of global 
terrorism preclude the United States from aiding the dispossessed of Sudan?  What does each of 
these trends suggest about American intentions moving forward?  
Analyzing U.S. policy in Sudan over the last two decades this research  attempts to weigh 
what the United States has actually done (i.e., devoted resources, energy, and time) versus what 
policy-makers say they want to do. The United States has interjected itself forcefully on 
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numerous occasions and in various locations in the world in the last several decades to achieve 
policy ends: Panama, Iraq, Haiti, and the Balkans are a few notable examples. While U. S. 
rhetoric emphasized the plight of the Sudanese people, and underscored the importance of 
stopping the conflict and refugee crisis, America did not employ the same exhaustive resources, 
diplomatically, or militarily, as it did elsewhere. U.S. policy in Sudan and in the region has 
overemphasized humanitarian ventures, without devoting as much attention diplomatically, or in 
resources, either monetarily or in personnel, to affect greater and more lasting tangible change in 
Sudan. Lack of diplomatic attention and in resources appears part of a long-lasting trend. Even 
during the Cold-War period, if Africa mattered geo-politically, it has mattered much less than 
other regions of the world to the United States.  
Using the above logic, we can briefly use the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) as 
a prime example of diplomacy supported by America in which the end goal is stated to be peace 
in the Sudan. The CPA, which will be discussed in greater detail later, if it was to be truly 
successful almost entirely depended on the good faith of the current Khartoum regime, the 
National Congress Party (NCP). In short, the NCP, formerly the National Islamic Front (NIF), 
not only needed to police and monitor the volatile situation on the ground, which it was primarily 
responsible for, but had to follow through on the essential power and land-sharing components of 
the agreement; as well, it had to discontinue its own offensive actions in the South, both through 
its own military and the proxy fighters it had continually and devastatingly employed and 
supported.  
However, since the resumption of the war in 1983 and up until time this paper was 
written, a litany of documented transgressions committed by the Sudanese government (GOS) 
have been presented to Congress. Over the past two decades (the current regime has been in 
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power since a 1989 coup) countless experts have testified to the perfidy of that regime. Many of 
these advisors have been employed on Congressional staffs. Additionally, countless documented 
cases of abuse, attacks on civilians, reports of genocide, as well as lies and misrepresentations, 
have been credited to the current Khartoum regime through various sources. Attacks along 
strategic border regions and the theft of oil from the South after independence continue to be 
chronicled.   
Assuming U.S. policy-makers truly believed that the current Khartoum regime would 
enforce the CPA, and cease its hegemonic practices, based on two decades of evidence to the 
contrary, one must attach a certain level of incompetence or unfortunate blind faith to those 
American decision-makers that is beyond comprehension. Further, the evidence has not and still 
does not support such a theory. Why then had the United States continued to support a policy 
that seemingly contradicts its own purported values? Policy-makers, on the one hand, have 
admonished the GOS for its lack of sincerity, pointing out its continued desire to dominate 
Sudan, while at the same time supporting a process in which power sharing, transparency, 
equality, and honesty are necessary preconditions that need to be in place to achieve that “stated 
goal”.  
This paper will demonstrate within its framework and discussion that although the stated 
American goal in Sudan was to end the suffering and conflict in Sudan, its actual approach has 
consistently, and knowingly in the last decades, the 1990s and up until 2006, been contrary to 
this stated aim. While there has frequently been a strong voice in Congress and from the 
President directed against GOS, as well as frequent humanitarian initiatives undertaken in Sudan, 
these initiatives cannot and should not be confused with actual firm or serious foreign policy 
measures that make tangible change in Sudan. The CPA, considered the crowning achievement 
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of the supported peace policy in Sudan, is just one example of measures to be explored herein, 
which have not been undertaken blindly or without insight, but have sadly failed to deliver the 
necessary attention and resources to affect true change. Quite contrarily, what appears to be a 
failure of American policy, when viewed through a different lens, appears to be a wish by some 
policy- makers to devote American resources elsewhere.  
Once again, American policy- makers were well informed about the situation in Sudan, 
but despite their stated desire to affect change, these same policy-makers have not seriously 
initiated the needed measures to achieve their desired outcome. First and foremost, this failure 
reflects a lack of self-interest in actually ending the crisis rather than simply addressing the 
humanitarian need, which although obviously intended to be at least somewhat altruistic, has not 
addressed the root cause or the true solution.  The measures undertaken in the past two decades 
have been humanitarian ventures, but only cursory support of a realistic peace process. The 
peace process, despite U.S. backing, failed to garner from the U.S. what it needed most: 
Diplomatic engagement, more resources, and effective numbers of personnel.  Both the peace 
process and the humanitarian initiatives were principally offered for political expediency to 
allow the United States the freedom to pursue its actual intended policy full energy and resources 
elsewhere.   
Additionally, while the United States—in terms of its relative budget— has never gone 
above and beyond to aid the dispossessed of Sudan, in real terms, both budget dollars and asylum 
numbers hit historic lows after 9-11. United States policy promoted its own self-interest and 
addressed worldwide terrorism- at the further expense of the victims in Sudan.      
 This writer does not presume that ending Sudan’s conflict and refugee problem will be 
easy—any endeavor toward this end is a monumental choice. However, this paper does propose 
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that the U.S. has willfully taken steps that cannot succeed in ending the suffering in Sudan. Any 
hope of achieving peace can be further aided by revealing clearly and precisely what is not 
working. While an explanation of possible changes in American policy or solutions will be 
offered in the closing comments of the paper, its main goal is to illuminate further United States’ 
policy as it relates to the Sudan in terms of its stated goals and its actual implementation.   
Chapter Two will discuss the historical background of the conflict in Sudan. While the 
conflict is complex and has evolved with many nuances, there is a great degree of continuity 
shown too; the primary connection being the continued, decades- long, political, cultural, 
military, and economic dominance emanating from Khartoum.  While various regimes have held 
sway in Khartoum, all have dominated the other regions of Sudan. It is difficult to believe that 
the NCP, the most aggressive and intransigent of these regimes will be inspired under the current 
status quo of international politics to do a volte-face in its policy any time soon.      
Chapter Three of the paper will consider the historical record as it relates to the conflict 
in Sudan and the response of the United States. Essential to this paper is the presumption—which 
the evidence supports—that the government of Sudan (GOS) is the fundamental causal link 
between peace and war in Sudan. Various scholars have suggested that U.S. policy failures are 
due to its inability to understand (or address) the complex nature of the conflict in Sudan. For 
example, Peter W. Klein, while documenting the history of the political fractures within rebel 
groups opposed to GOS, especially in Darfur, seemingly divests Khartoum from its lead role in 
the war.  Although these assumptions should be considered, they are inherently flawed when 
viewing the evidence. First and foremost, United States policy-makers were indeed informed 
about the conflict. For more than two decades, Congress has listened to scholars and experts in 
the field, many of whom are now consultants to the U.S., as well as heard countless reports from 
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NGO’s, victims, journalists, and even movie stars. While the United States’ policy in Sudan, 
which often seemed cursory, gave rise to the notion that policy makers are uniformed, actual 
evidence does not suggest that to be fully the case.   
To establish the proper context and framework for our investigation into U.S. policy in 
Sudan, it has been necessary to address all these items briefly here in this introduction and then 
later at greater length. The one constant and unquestionable maxim in Sudan is that the 
government of Sudan has been and continues to be the catalyst for war there. Although this paper 
will focus primarily on U.S. policy in Sudan post-Cold War, it is also relevant to connect the 
historic trend in Sudan that illuminates a longer history of hegemonic and belligerent activity that 
has emanated from Khartoum.  
Illuminating transgressions of various rebel groups does not divorce other individuals of 
responsibility, nor does that discussion inherently prove that such behavior was the full causal 
agent of the war itself. Nazi hegemony and policy during World War II was the impetus for a 
wide range of large-scale transgressions and atrocities, even civil war, in many of the nations 
then under its yoke.  In much the same way, the Sudanese government cannot be separated from 
its role as the primary agent for war in Sudan.   
Thus, analyzing the historical record, especially primary documents, allows a clearer 
picture to form. Without a change in Khartoum’s policy, and more importantly its deeply rooted 
ideology, peace will not be achieved in Sudan (nor now with independent South Sudan) unless 
international foreign policy evolves. While the U.S. backed Comprehensive Peace Agreement 
(CPA) simplistically disregarded other rebel factions in favor of a peace signed between GOS 
and the SPLA/M, this obstacle does not mean that the United States has acted in ignorance of 
these other nuances. The belief supported in this paper is indicative of the failures that have 
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befallen the CPA, namely, that U.S. policy makers –based on the resources which they have 
devoted to peace in Sudan- are not realistically anticipating actual peace.  
The foundation for this belief is analyzed in Chapters Two and Three and derives from 
both from the historical record and the actual words of American policy-makers. First, the record 
shows that GOS has no intention of changing its goal of dominating all of Sudan. Secondly, as 
previously discussed, American policy- makers were well informed and aware of the nuances of 
the current conflict, and most of all of Khartoum’s failure to live up to its promises. The United 
States Congress noted these failures countless times for at least the past two decades.   
Perhaps the most compelling promise by GOS—and the most perplexing element of the 
CPA—is that the Sudanese Government has been expected to live up to its promises and enforce 
the peace process. How is American rhetoric, both as admonishment of GOS and having faith in 
such a peace process, then reconciled? To explore this aspect and pursue American initiatives, I 
will be largely using Congressional records, policy initiatives, and international policy supported 
by the United States.    
Chapter Four will discuss the crisis of displacement in Sudan since the resumption of the 
war in 1983.  The suffering of the dispossessed, horrific in scope, is also relevant to U.S. policy. 
The ebb and flow of asylum cases, as well as reflecting American interest in the region, are 
relevant because they work hand in hand with America’s peace initiatives in the region, and 
America’s current war on terror. The alleged peace in Sudan that was ushered in with the signing 
of the CPA has been used by the United States as a pretext for supporting repatriation of 
Sudanese refugees back to Sudan as well as determining a lower number of asylum cases 
accepted into the United States. This route, indicative of America’s historic indifference toward 
the Sudan, not only underscores the notion of “peace” in the Sudan, a necessary component of 
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the U.S. backed CPA, but also complements America’s attempts post  9-11 to secure its borders.  
With peace in Sudan, rather than accepting precarious asylum cases, the United States could 
encourage repatriation of refugees, as well as IDPs, back to their homes in Sudan. Additionally, 
while America needed only Khartoum’s lip service supporting the peace process, the war on 
terror after 9/11 required real, tangible cooperation, a factor that has further hindered what slim 
chance that did exist for the United States to take a tougher stance toward the Sudanese 
Government. Where does this leave American policy in terms of the Sudanese crisis?  
Unfortunately, that course, delineated in this chapter, has been almost strictly a humanitarian 
approach by the United States at the expense of undertaking real diplomacy or action. Questions 
about the end legitimacy of humanitarianism, as well as how such activity has worked in 
conjunction with America’s true future aims will be discussed.  
To finish, Chapter Five will tie together the major themes of this paper and offer insight 
into what United States policy has been in Sudan very precisely in the past and currently and 
where it seeks to go and will likely go in the future. Again, and perhaps most importantly, this 
analysis can only be weighed by examining what policy makers have said they want to do versus 
what they have actually done.  While the tragedy in Sudan and Darfur (and now the border 
conflict with South Sudan) will surely continue to inspire compassionate voices in Washington, 
is that compassion enough to change the foreign policy direction? And if not, and without 
America’s full resources, what can be done differently in Sudan to affect positive change and 
hopefully resolution? Additionally, the spirit, principles, and laws espoused by the Organization 
of African Unity (OAU) have suffered from the same shortcomings that plagued the United 
Nations and international law after World War II. Recently the OAU has morphed into the 
African Union (AU). With the decolonization and Cold War fears no longer the general order of 
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the day, African leaders, at least in theory, are more committed to injecting themselves more 
forcefully to protect African lives and their well-being, regardless of sovereignty. What impact 
will this have on Sudan moving forward?  Therein is the question to be explored in this 
discussion.       
22 
CHAPTER TWO: THE HISTORY OF CONFLICT AND DISPOSSESSION IN SUDAN 
The civil war in Sudan was a product of the nation’s colonial past.  The monumental 
events that swept the African continent and led to Sudan’s independence, as well as that of many 
other African nations, occurred in the second half of the twentieth century. In many ways this 
historical change forged the character, political structures, and world view of all these nations. 
The seminal event leading up to independence was the period of European imperial domination 
that reached its zenith in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.  Despite the success and 
initial euphoria over independence, the African continent, including Sudan, was beset by several 
deeply rooted problems that have lasted too long.   
First, the borders for the independent African states, including Sudan, were drawn, at the 
height of imperialism by European hands with little or no regard for the ethnic, religious, or 
cultural diversity found in Africa. Additionally, in many instances geographical obstacles or 
differences in diversity were ignored. This is especially true in the Western region of Sudan, 
where today Darfur has more in common not only geographically, but culturally, with the people 
of neighboring Southeastern Chad. Despite the diversity, and inherent problems of nation 
building under such circumstances, the African States, as codified by the Organization of African 
Unity (OAU), have doggedly clung to the principle of state sovereignty.  This concept of 
sovereignty has also played a substantial role in the formation of the Western world view, 
including U.S. policy, post- World War II.  
  Fearful of Communist takeovers throughout the world, the United States’ foreign policy, 
as well as the United Nation’s refugee and human rights policy, were crafted with the external 
threat posed by the Soviet Union constantly in mind. Unfortunately internal issues within the 
African States, including Sudan, such as corrupt regimes, human rights violations, 
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displacements, and democratic reform, often took a back seat, both for the West and these new 
African nations, to address perceived larger concerns.  It was against this backdrop The Republic 
of Sudan was born.  
The Sudan today encompasses a region that spreads over a million square miles, twice 
the size of Alaska. 
13
  This immense land, tremendously diverse, ethnically, geographically, and 
religiously, was first held under Egyptian sway in the 1800s. While Sudan has hundreds of 
different ethnic groups, perhaps as many as 600, the majority of Sudanese can be identified as 
black African (52%) or Arab (39%).
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   Arab Muslims  arrived  in the 7
th
 century, while the 
South, not geographically well connected to the northern lands, remained isolated from Muslim, 
Arab influence. In fact, a vast swamp, known as the Sudd, helped to exacerbate the natural 
boundary between the two regions.
15
 It was not until the first half of the 19
th
 century with British 
influence ever increasing that trade routes were opened. These routes led to the expansion of 
Arab-Islamic influence into the southern reaches of Sudan. Arab influence and trade in that 
region eventually morphed into outright plunder and slave raiding.  It was during this period that 
the polar nature of the future Sudanese state emerged; the Arab, predominantly Muslim north, 
dominated and exploited the African, Christian, and Animist South.  Eventually falling under an 
Egyptian Condominium

 in 1899, British influence continued to expand in the region. The 
British, in wake of the Mahdist uprising, and fearing the
 
spread of more radical Islamic 
movements, formulated separate policies for the South and the North. Development in the North 
focused on the seat of government in Khartoum, ignoring the economic, political, and social 
                                                 
 Britain and Egypt exercised joint authority south of the twenty second parallel from 1899 to 1955. Historically 
under Egyptian suzerainty, but prior to 1899 under Ottoman sway, the land became Anglo-Egyptian Sudan after its 
re-conquest by Egyptian and British forces.  While in theory jointly ruled, Anglo Egyptian Sudan was administered 
by the British under a governor general.        
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development in the South.  Indeed, the British required outsiders to carry special permits to 
travel in the South.
16
 Encouraged by the British, economic development focused on Khartoum at 
the expense of the South as well as other Sudanese regions. 
The South remained woefully underdeveloped economically, politically, educationally, 
and in terms of infrastructure.  The minimal gains made in education came from Western 
missionaries who spread the English language along with Christianity. 
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 Additionally, despite 
the majority of the future state identifying with an African, Animist or Christian outlook, leading 
members of Sudan’s Graduates Congress suggested that non- Arab people be “lifted up” by 
being assimilated into an Arabic and Islamic world view.
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  Therefore, along with those in a 
position of power, Sudanese nationalism took a predominantly Islamic and Arab outlook.  
Despite these inequities, which were manifested in a North-South dichotomy, Britain eventually 
acceded to Sudan’s push to for independence in 1955.  
In August 1955, months prior to independence, Sudan was awash in civil unrest as 
northerners gained control of the government.  Of 800 senior government posts, only 6 were 
filled by Southerners.
19
 The turmoil in the streets eventually was followed by outright mutiny 
and secessionist movements by Southern troops. The impetus behind such anger was the 
government decision to place Northern military officers in the South. It proved to be the tipping 
point, eventually leading to widespread local support of the secessionist movement and outright 
rebellion against the Khartoum government.  The rebellion, before being suppressed by 
government troops, captured entire Equatoria Province, except for the capital, Juba. However, 
the abatement of violence signaled neither an end to the conflict nor a beginning of more 
equitable government practices.      
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When Sudan became independent in January of 1956, promises for a federal constitution 
to protect the Southern provinces from subordination and Northern control were conveniently 
ignored.
20
  Not surprisingly, forty-three of a forty-six member committee that drafted the 
Constitution were from the North.
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  Eventually a military coup against the civilian government 
in 1958, led by General Ibrahim Abboud, extinguished the already dim hopes for a more 
representative government in Sudan. While access to political representation continued to be the 
key obstacle to peace, race and religion had an impact as well. Peter W. Klein, author of “Tea 
and Sympathy”, mistakenly suggests “religion did not have an impact on the first civil war.” 22 
Events would prove religion and race historically have been paramount to understanding the 
dynamics of power and conflict in Sudan.   
Abboud, an advocate of an Islamic, Arab state, misguidedly believed that promotion of 
these ideals would lead to a unified state.  Limited political representation, coupled with 
government arrogance in promoting its religious agenda, proved to be troublesome. While 
Southerners saw religious schools as an opportunity to compete for government jobs, many 
Muslims viewed the missionary zeal, and previous British policy as the cause of Southern angst 
and the development of a separate Southern identity.  Ultimately Abboud’s coercive practices, 
namely, expelling Christian missionaries and the construction of mosques in the South, led to the 
most tenacious and concerted effort by Southerners to fight the Khartoum regime.  
The already fragmentary nature of Sudan, politically, racially, and religiously, was 
further exacerbated by government economic policies that sought to move Sudan toward a 
modern mechanized agricultural economy.  By the 1960s, private interest in agriculture had 
given way to large-scale commercial farming.  The process spread throughout Sudan, making its 
way south and then west through Southern Kordofan and Darfur. 
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 In addition to degrading the 
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already fragile environment, this process of modernization and agricultural mechanization was to 
set a pattern of competition for scarce resources that would become an integral part of the future 
and the Sudanese conflict.   
However, during the 1960s, lack of political representation continued to be the 
momentum behind Southern anger.  When the military regime led by Abboud failed to address 
grievances, dissidents in the South known as the Anyanya

 began a new stage in the history of 
Sudan, first striking and then taking up arms, sparking an intractable civil war that began in 
1963. Once it was clear Abboud could not quell the resistance, he stepped down, and a national 
government was formed during the “October Revolution” of 1964. Additionally, although the 
fighting had reached an impasse, relative destruction in the South and repression of civilian 
population by government troops led to tens of thousands of Southern Sudanese being displaced.   
Despite the dire outlook, the Northern politicians who succeeded Abboud “rejected any form of 
self-determination or regional autonomy for the [S]south and pursued the same policies of 
repression.” 24 
As the conflict continued, Northern Arab Sudanese who dominated the government were 
threatened on several fronts, only one of which was the increasing political and cultural 
assertiveness of non-Arab Sudanese. In fact, far from “fanatical,”25 many Northerners used an 
Islamist agenda to achieve a political end. Historians and ethnologists have long determined the 
tag of “Arab” to be a racial construct in the Sudan. For many of these Northern politicians, their 
particular brand of Arab Islamic culture was motivated by a fear of losing both political power 
and access to resources. It was purely political reasons that led many right- wing Northern 
                                                 
 The Southern rebels during Sudan’s first civil war were known as Anyanya, a term in the Madi language meaning 
“snake venom”.  
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politicians to push for an Islamic constitution. 
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 However, as a consequence of increased 
education and fairer elections, both non-Arabs, and marginalized Arab Muslims then cut into the 
power base of Khartoum’s traditional political players, paving the way for a precarious political 
scenario.  
From this uncertainty, one of Sudan’s longest tenured leaders, Jaafar Muhammad 
Nimeiri, came to prominence. Heading a military coup in 1969, which brought power to a 
revolutionary command council, Nimeiri sought to rid Sudan of factionalism and the sectarian 
politics associated with the different religious- based political parties. Nimeiri faced opposition 
from several fronts. Imam al-Hadi al-Mahdi, a grandson of the famous 19
th
 century Mahdi

, 
attempted an uprising in 1970 that was eventually put down; the Communists were even able to 
imprison Nimeiri after a brief coup in 1971, before themselves being quickly overwhelmed by 
government troops.  
Upon securing his own position, Nimeiri, in the first taste of peace and democracy for 
Southerners pledged autonomy for the South.
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 This monumental peace, signed at Addis Ababa 
in 1972 seemed to pave the way for a new more peaceful Sudan. The three Southern provinces 
were linked together as a separate region with its own elected assembly and executive authority, 
while the former Southern rebels were accepted into the ranks of the Sudanese army. 
Additionally, a new constitution in 1973 tried to wash away the stains of religious intolerance, 
establishing Sudan as a secular state, for not only Christians and Jews, but also those with 
traditional African beliefs. 
28
 
                                                 
 In Islamic theology Mahdi refers to a messiah, a “guided one”; believed to be a descendant of Muhammad, the 
Mahdi will return before Judgment Day to rid the Earth of evil and strife. Self-proclaimed Mahdi, Muhammad 
Ahmad, fought several brutal campaigns against the British in an attempt to expel the British from Sudan at the end 
of the 19th century before being defeated.  
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While Nimeiri should be credited for making enlightened decisions for the future of 
Sudan that did lead to a ten -year peace, it was ultimately under his guidance that war returned to 
Sudan in 1983. The idealism associated with Addis Ababa often obscured the true motivations of 
the politicians, as they fought to stay afloat in the contentious and sectarian world of Sudanese 
politics. Several factors were key to Nimeiri’s move toward reversals in policy after ten years of 
peace. First, Nimeiri often was motivated –not by ideals- but by his own self- preservation; 
political expediency was often the order of the day. Nimeiri’s support of regional autonomy in 
the South (in accordance with the peace agreement) was contrary to his prior support of Pan-
Arabism or a consolidated (or confederated) system of Northern African “Arab” states. His 
decision to abandon this agenda appears to have been motivated by several factors. 
 First, prior to Addis Ababa, the push for Pan-Arabism may have been too strong, 
alienating the Islamic Arabs (who preferred their own brand of Islam) as well as non-Arabs, 
while strengthening Southerners’ distrust of government intentions. 29  A leftist coup, fueled by 
discontent over a rumored union with Egypt, may also have led Nimeiri to make the fateful 
decision to reach out to the south. Nevertheless, negotiations with the South, although keeping 
Nimeiri temporarily afloat and even gaining some moderate support in the North, were not 
promising in the long run, as Northern conservatives were less than happy with them .The 
Islamists or pan-Arabists, and even the Arab Sudanese “in general were still opposed to sharing 
power with the rest, while the civil service was known to be strongly against regionalism.”30  
With this unfortunate and untenable backdrop the peace agreement and Nimeiri’s hold on power 
became more precarious and depended on many variables.   
While the forces that threatened to fracture Sudan were many, these may have been 
overcome had the policies of the Nimeiri regime been more successful.  Sudan’s economic 
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policies under Nimeiri proved to be an abject failure, straining the already delicate relationship 
that existed between the disparate groups in Sudan.  First and foremost, mechanization and 
agricultural commercialization, coupled with land tenure and the switch to mono-crop schemes, 
largely cotton, not only had a negative impact on the economy, but also damaged the 
environment, which increased the tension over land use and ownership, especially among 
pastoral peoples.  The growth of mechanized farming shrunk the resource base drastically. For 
example, traditionally 9 million feddans

 supported about 2.5 million farmers, but under the new 
commercial policies, this same total supported only about 8,000 absent farmers. 
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 While 
providing wealth for a few, much of the population, who were chiefly pastoralists and 
subsistence farmers became impoverished, losing land and having to sell their labor as migratory 
workers to survive.  
Additionally, Northern Sudan, much of which sits above the thirteenth parallel is dry and 
parched, a situation that led to government encroachment below this geographic line to seize its 
resources and exploit its agricultural potential.
32
   By 1977, forced to borrow from wealthy 
nations and the World Bank, Sudan’s debt was $2B.33   Also, drought and famine now swept 
large parts of Sudan, causing crops to fail and herds to die.  A shortage of already scarce 
resources only increased the uncertainty and tension between the varying groups in Sudan.  
Several prominent scholars have suggested that GOS economic policies were not simply 
inept, but had a more ominous goal, namely to once again subdue the south. Peter Kok suggests 
that these economic policies were tantamount to a land grab in which the GOS appropriated land, 
minerals, water, and oil.
34
  Jok Madut Jok, explains that economic policy was also tied to the 
                                                 
 A unit of area used in Egypt, Sudan and Syria. Literally means a ‘yoke of oxen’ or the area of land that could be 
tilled by them in a certain amount of time. 1 feddan = 1.038 acres.  
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heritage of slavery in Sudan, insisting that these economic policies compelled non-Arabs to 
migrate and work for “slave wages” while being subjugated by a type of cultural hegemony in 
which they had to adopt Arab culture and convert to Islam.
35
  David Keen goes even further and 
suggests that the environmental disaster and subsequent famine that befell Sudan in the early 
1980’s, of which the economic policies have long been cited as the  cause, were actually 
manufactured by the government to support its political agenda of forcing Southerners from their 
lands.    In addition, the discovery of oil reserves by Chevron in the late 1970’s, claims Eric 
Reeves, Inspired even further lasting exploitative government practices.   
Regardless of the government’s intent, one thing was for certain. The failed economy, 
along with several other key factors, put Nimeiri in a very precarious position as President. As 
the economy failed and famine loomed, Southern leaders were still largely unable to interject 
themselves fully into Northern politics to try and change the direction of the nation and its   fate.  
For example, Southern politician, Abel Alier, managed Southern affairs as President of the High 
Executive council (HEC) from 1972-1978,
36
 but his obsequious obedience to President Nimeir 
allowed the North essentially to push unwanted policies on the South.  Southerners, intent on 
change, voted Alier out and Joseph Lagu in as HEC in 1978. However, after a brief spat with the 
judiciary, Nimeiri removed Lagu only to be replaced again by the more pliant Alier. 
In wake of Addis Ababa and Nimeri’s failed policies, the President also felt increased 
pressure from the Northern politicians. Following several coup attempts led by Northern 
factions, Nimeiri shifted policy once again. In 1977 the President oversaw a “National 
Reconciliation”.  The move appeared to be an enlightened one.  Nimeiri released political 
prisoners, reined in restrictions on the press, and opened up national politics to a wider base. 
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However, despite these seemingly cursory appearances, Nimeiri was quietly moving Sudan once 
again toward civil war.  
First, this apparent reconciliation was not intended as a welcome mat for Southerners to 
joint Khartoum’s political fold; rather it was meant to “broaden the base of his [Nimeri’s] 
support in the [N]north.”37 With the economy in shambles and his political stock falling, Nimeiri, 
fell back once again to political expediency, but this time by courting Northern favor. Yet, 
opening up the government to men like Sadiq al-Mahdi, who had led a Libyan -backed coup 
against Nimeiri in 1976, and Hassan al-Turabi, leader of the National Islamic Front, a militant 
Islamic party,  the move could only be viewed by Southerners as having a hostile intent. 
Secondly, Nimeiri’s introduction of Shari’a law in 1983 was a shocking reversal of Addis 
Ababa, and while gaining the support of scores of Northern politicians in doing so, the decision 
expectedly was met by Southerners with calls for war.  Additionally, along with the introduction 
of a now challenged religious law, Nimeiri, going against the agreed -upon boundaries of Addis 
Ababa, attempted to restructure the South into three regions, weakening the South and providing 
an opportunity to incorporate Southern oil reserves.  Lastly, in circumstances strikingly similar to 
1955, Southern troops stationed in the city of Bor mutinied after receiving orders to be 
transferred north.  While the troop mutiny conveyed parallels to the first civil war the second 
civil war would change in both scope and character.  
While it is difficult to compare the second Sudanese conflict, which began in 1983, to 
both the first civil war in Sudan, and other international conflicts, it can only be described as a 
monumental human catastrophe.  The reasons for the intractability and suffering associated with 
this war are myriad: The Sudanese government’s commitment to resolving the crisis by military 
means, as opposed to diplomacy, has become more resolute.  The war effort has been propelled 
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by GOS’s development of a modern economy.  The extraction of oil in Sudan (and its 
procurement), as well as the development of mechanized, modern agricultural schemes, both of 
which have received international dollars, as well as support from the World Bank and the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF), have created riches that have been co-opted by the Sudanese 
government for its war effort.  GOS’s policy of war through proxy fighters has also been 
devastating. These militias, often made up of Arab- speaking African tribes from South Darfur 
and Kordofan, have displaced hundreds of thousands, perpetuating a terrible humanitarian crisis 
while also creating an extremely fluid, and complex situation, as groups within The Sudan 
compete for land and resources.  The horn of Africa in the 1980’s suffered a horrific drought and 
famine, adding to the numbers and the suffering of Sudan’s dispossessed.   
While the government’s policy has fractured and then pitted disparate groups against one 
another, so too has the rebel resistance.  While resistance to government policy comes from 
many distinct peoples and regions, the leadership and character of the most internationally 
recognized rebel group, the Sudanese People’s Liberation Movement and Army (SPLM/SPLA) 
is now associated almost exclusively with the Dinka. Fractures within the rebel resistance and 
opposition to SPLM/A

 leadership, as well as its policies, have created another war within a war, 
as well as further impetus for displacement.   Lastly, while Sudan’s civil war is inescapably 
linked with displacement (both refugees and internally displaced persons/IDPs), the international 
community has moved toward a humanitarian approach when dealing with these types of 
conflicts. While sovereignty, during this period, has lost its inviolable nature, yielding a certain 
                                                 
 The SPLA, the military designation for the Southern rebels, and SPLM, denoting the political arm of the 
movement are often combined reflecting the shared leadership and connectedness of both arms of Southern 
resistance.    
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success in terms of conflict resolution, more often than not, especially in the Third World, 
internal strife and conflict, has only led wealthier nations to pursue a policy of humanitarian aid. 
This aid can at best give but short term relief to the dispossessed, while at worst, it has been 
argued, that aid can just perpetuate war 
The changes made by Nimeiri in the late 1970’s and early 1980’s could only be viewed 
by the Southerners as an abandonment of the historic peace made at Addis Ababa in 1972. One 
Southern soldier, officer John Garang, a Dinka, was ordered  to Khartoum to quell the uprising in 
Bor in 1983, but instead joined the mutineers, quickly becoming the skilled leader of a growing 
resistance movement.  The military wing of the resistance movement, the SPLA, grew to 20,000 
by 1985
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 under Garang’s leadership, the military proved to a match for the government.  
Although many Southerners came to advocate a break with the North, Garang, a shrewd 
statesman, realized that international support was more likely to follow, and thus claimed that the 
rebels were really fighting for a “unified, secular Sudan.”39 
While the war raged on, the economy continued its precipitous decline; foreign debt of 12 
billion dollars accrued by 1985, while agricultural production continued to decrease. 
Additionally, drought struck first in 1983 and again in 1984. Coupled with the war going poorly, 
the famine that followed became a “rallying point” for organized protest against the regime.40 
The ubiquity of protesters and rioters and coming from professionals, trade unions, intellectuals, 
and students, reflected how far the Nimeiri regime had fallen. What was perhaps the last straw 
was in 1985 when the government raised food and fuel prices, sparking the ousting of Nimeiri 
after sixteen years.  The Army in April of 1985 set up a transitional military council, which 
would temporarily rule the nation before ceding control to a coalition government. 
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 After the general election the new regime was led by Sadiq al Mahdi, head of the 
UMMA Party. Mahdi looked to consolidate his power, forming a coalition with the Democratic 
Unionist Party (DUP). While both groups favored settling the war, neither intended to make 
major concessions; in fact, the issue of religion (shari’a law remained in force) remained a major 
hurdle in finding peace. Additionally, the Mahdi’s victory at the polls was hardly indicative of a 
universal vote, as 36 of the 67 southern constituencies could not vote due to the continuing civil 
war.
41
 The SPLM, not surprisingly, boycotted the election results.   
Sadiq al-Mahdi, like his predecessor Nimeiri, governed less by ideology and was more 
concerned with keeping his regime afloat in Sudan’s precarious world of politics. Mahdi kept his 
options open, continuing the war in the south by arming proxy militias and also attempting a 
rapprochement with the South. However, his vacillation between the two positions ultimately 
signaled the s downfall of his regime. First, many Northerners –including many in the military—
realized that  waging the war in a half -hearted manner would only prolong the conflict 
indefinitely.  With the economy in shambles and drought exacerbating the suffering of all 
Sudanese, many Northerners asked the government to end Sudan’s crisis. The end of the crisis, it 
was believed, could only be achieved by either complete commitment to the war or complete 
commitment to the peace process.  
In August of 1986, Mahdi met with John Garang to attempt to negotiate a settlement.  
The effort was short lived. During the negotiations, the SPLA shot down a civilian plane loaded 
with emergency relief.  It was heading to a town held by the government. Additionally, the 
government transgressions continued.  Proxy raids into the South grew more frequent and costly; 
the Dinka would testify that raids in Bahr al-Ghazal and South Kordofan increased to levels 
“never seen before”.42  By 1986, in oil rich Bentiu, 160,000 was driven from their homes, and in 
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the Bor district, 90,000 Dinka fled.
43
 The SPLA likewise retaliated against the proxy fighters, 
setting in motion a brutal string of retaliation killings, abductions, and other atrocities committed 
against Dinka and the Nuer areas of Bahr-al-Ghazal. With the tone shifting now to a true war 
front, Mahdi abruptly dropped the DUP from his coalition to link with the more militant, 
fundamentalist NIF. The new coalition then simply “pursued the war with greater vigor and 
enforced shari’a more stringently.”44 
While Mahdi and the NIF ratcheted up the war effort, the DUP, Mahdi’s former coalition 
partner, took the opportunity to negotiate and sign a peace plan with the SPLM in November of 
1988. However, the Sudanese Parliament, now clearly on a war footing, rejected any negotiated 
peace. The DUP subsequently left the government. Government policy had led to the 
dispossession of hundreds of thousands, but Mahdi had also deliberately, not requested famine 
relief for the South.  In fact, in a bad omen of things to come, Mahdi’s coalition partner, NIF 
member Hassan al Turabi, stated that “the more people who die or flee the [S[south, the weaker 
the SPLA becomes.”45 By 1988, 250,000 Southern Sudanese had perished46.   However, despite 
the destructiveness visited upon the South, the SPLA seemed only to gain in strength; the effect 
was to ensure indefinite suffering in Sudan, which ultimately also led to increased pressure on 
the current regime from home and abroad.    
Although reaching a peak in its communication of events in Sudan late in the 1990’s, by 
1989, the American media has begun to cover and draw attention to the conflict and the 
humanitarian disaster taking place in Sudan. Often described as an African-Christian versus 
Arab-Muslim conflict, the overly simplistic media portrayal creates what became known as the 
“Lost Boys” phenomenon. Such attention shamefully reduced the conflict and its victims to 
characterizations of African refugees’ (usually Dinkas) fleeing Arab horsemen or proxy fighters, 
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often called Janjaweed

  in the news reports.  However, these harrowing stories did spark the 
attention of the American public as well as the government.      
An outraged American public demanded that President Bush and Congress withhold 
funds and pressure Sudan into allowing humanitarian aid into Sudan.
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   With no end in sight to 
the crisis, Mahdi again swapped allegiances, agreeing to the DUP’s previously negotiated 
“November Plan.” This “volte-face” in his position, which called for a cease fire and a freeze of 
shari’a law, was a last ditch effort by the then current regime to stay in power, but that was not to 
be. 
A coup, under the banner of the National Salvation Revolution, on June 30,   1989, not 
only ended the peace negotiations, but also  placed the government in the hands of the the 
Islamic militants.  The aims of the new regime, led by NIF leader, General Omar al-Bashir, were 
simple-- exercise complete and total war, no matter how horrific, to ensure victory and preserve 
a particular brand of Arab-Islamic hegemony that would emanate from Khartoum. To achieve 
this Machiavellian endeavor, the new regime suspended the constitution, dissolved Parliament, 
political parties, and trade unions and closed down the newspapers.
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  This total war and 
scorched earth policy under al-Bashir would be to perpetuate, as it delivered into the hands of the 
government, more resources to devote just to military spending.  Not surprisingly, the proxy 
attacks on the south, begun under Mahdi, continued. Then a new element –as the West began to 
                                                 
 Coming to use in the late 1980s, the term Janjaweed can be loosely translated as “spirit or devil on horseback” or 
simply “gunman on horseback.”  Janjaweed attacks at the end of the 1980s was more sporadic; horseman, 
identifying themselves as Arab (typically Bagarra), often attacked Dinka villages in the northern Bahr El Ghazal and 
southern Kordofan. In Darfur (2003 –present) government sponsored militias from Chad and Darfur, also identified 
as Janjaweed, and from various ethnic groups (most promoting their “Arabism”), carried out attacks against 
perceived enemies of Khartoum. The government in both instances has deflected responsibility – conflict in the late 
1980s was described as “tribal” in nature, while more recent attacks in Darfur are transparently linked to popular or 
grass roots movements or expressions of “Arabism.” However, both viewpoints have been discredited by scholars; it 
is well documented that Janjaweed attacks are organized, politicized and recruited by Khartoum.           
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provide aid for the dispossessed- emerged, as the GOS manipulated that aid inhumanely with the 
aim of starving the South into surrender. 
Begun in 1989 and re-initiated the following year as Phase II, Operation Lifeline Sudan 
(OLS) had as its intention the providing of aid and relief to Sudan and was organized through a 
consortium of UN agencies and non-governmental organizations (NGO’s).  However, from the 
beginning, OLS was essentially “hijacked” by the GOS; relief sites were bombed and attacked; 
aid workers not supporting the North’s war were kicked out of the country, and although 70% of 
Sudan’s internally displaced people (IDP’s) were in the south, Bashir demanded that 85% of the 
humanitarian aid go to the government -held zones. 
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While the South had continued to have some successes against the new regime, the tide 
of the war began to shift in the early 1990’s. First, the SPLA’s major benefactor, Ethiopia’s 
Communist dictator, Mengistu Haile Mariam, fled to Zimbabwe after his forces were defeated in 
that nation’s civil war. The new Ethiopian regime was opposed to harboring SPLA members and 
was hostile toward Sudanese refugees.  Aside from becoming easy targets for Bashir’s forces, the 
mass exodus of Sudanese refugees put a further strain on SPLA unity.  
The SPLA, never as uniform or united as the media had portrayed it to be ,began to 
splinter under the pressure, dividing itself down ideological and ethnic lines. Riek Machar led the 
Nuer against Garang and the Dinka faction of the SPLA, and Machar questioned Garang’s 
alleged servile connection with Ethiopia, and thus Garang’s commitment to the Sudanese 
conflict. Additionally, a bone of contention was the treatment of the dispossessed, especially 
children living in camps, who fell victim too often to all types of egregious behavior, including 
impressment into the SPLA ranks.   Lastly, Garang declared that, despite government 
intransigency, he would stick to his vision of a unified, but secular, Sudan. Machar and others, 
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however, wanted a complete break and an independent South. Nonetheless, whatever the 
grievances on either side of the conflict, the results were deadly. Both factions were as 
destructive as the government forces, burning towns, raping women, and impressing men and 
boys into military service.  From 1991 to 1995, more Southerners would die as a result of 
ongoing fighting between these two factions, than in the war against GOS. 
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Not to be outdone, Bashir’s regime in the 1990’s, aided by increased government 
revenues and Hassan al-Turabi’s odious Islamic rhetoric, waged a devastating “religious” war 
against both soldiers and civilians alike. Led largely by Turabi’s efforts, the NIF enforced a pan- 
Islamist agenda that included:  (1) A moral code based on the regime’s interpretation of Islamic 
law; (2) provision of a sanctuary to and encouraging extremist elements like Osama bin Laden; 
(3) promotion of the Arabisation in the public sphere, including in education; and (4) creation of 
a People’s Defense Force (PDF), modeled on Iran’s Revolutionary Guards whose numbers 
eventually reached 150,000. 
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While it is hard to gauge the true religious zeal of the Northerners, it would be fair to 
conclude that many Sudanese –including many in Bashir’s regime- used Muslim and Arab 
identity as a tool of repression to ensure their continued dominance in Khartoum.  Two important 
examples of literature, “Local Politics in the Time of Turabi’s Revolution”, by Michael Kevane 
and Leslie Gray, and “Darfur the Ambiguous Genocide” by Gerard Prunier demonstrate that 
religion and ethnicity were wielded together in Sudan much like a valued weapon. Kevane and 
Gray’s work reveals at the local level individuals’ manipulating the governmental rhetoric to 
disenfranchise their neighbors. Additionally, Prunier looked at the history of Arab identification 
as a construct and a government tool in Sudan. While very fluid in its nature, racial 
identification, claims Prunier, was used by Khartoum’s elite as a means to restrict others from 
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gaining power.  Additionally, as the war in the 1990’s extended into Muslim areas like the Nuba 
Mountains and threatened the effectiveness of religious rhetoric, the government quickly issued 
Fatwas, suggesting that particular Muslim populations (especially non-Arabs) were traitors or 
apostates.    
By the mid-1990s, Bashir’s policies had ravaged the South.  While depopulating the 
South had long been a major war aim, Chevron’s discovery of oil, along with the total war 
mentality of GOS, had increased the intensity of governmental and proxy attacks on Southerners.   
The Greater Nile Petroleum Operating Company (GNPOC), which was made up of a consortium 
of nations, including Malaysia, China, and Canada, thus agreed in 1992 that 40 per cent of oil 
profits would go to Khartoum.
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  Eric Reeves, author of “Oil Development in Sudan”, comments 
that it is no coincidence that GNPOC’s refinery is miles from the air strip used to shell the 
South
53
;  undoubtedly, control over the oil, as well as the actual revenue from this valuable 
resource, only increased the scope and severity of the war.      
By the end of the decade, defense spending by GOS had increased 96 per cent.  
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A 
United States Congressional session of the Subcommittee on International Operations and 
Human Rights in 2000, described the war during that decade as a government- driven “genocidal 
religious war,” which had turned the South into a “hell on earth,” killing an estimated 2,000,000 
in the past decade. In 1998 alone, 100,000 had died because the NIF denied then humanitarian 
aid.
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   A UN report estimated in 1999 that there were about 1.8 million displaced within Sudan, 
many by the war and government policies. 
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  The NIF’s  savage treatment of civilians (many 
                                                 
 Chevron discovered oil in the late 1970s, but the company withdrew when several of its workers were killed by 
Southern opposition. The oil was discovered in areas near the 1956 division between North and South. Much of 
Sudan’s oil exists in the Abyei region an area even after the 2005 CPA hotly contested.  
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who continued to  languish in camps), as well as its religious extremism and the harboring of 
known terrorists, had earned by the latter half of the 1990’s, Sudan’s government the unenviable 
status of rogue nation.   
Exposed and under increasing pressure, Bashir looked to adapt his policies, aiming to win 
the war, but still improve his regime’s public relations. His efforts took several directions. First, 
Bashir severed relations with Turabi, whose legacy, both in terms of his connection to 
international terrorism, and the eventual rebellion in Darfur would prove to be significant. 
Secondly, Bashir began to expel terrorists from Sudan, including bin Laden. Thirdly, Bashir 
entered into negotiations with Riek Machar’s faction of the rebels, even signing a peace 
agreement with it in 1997.
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 However, these changes seem to indicate a savvier Bashir, who was 
able to gauge the increasing international pressure better, and was now able to deflect and delay 
more effectively by simply keeping up the appearance of transformation.  
First, the arrangements made with Machar’s faction can hardly be seen as a genuine true 
push for peace; Bashir’s regime, buying time with Machar and with the international community, 
was able to continue a divide and conquer strategy. The government’s war against the SPLA also 
continued.  Additionally, the proxy wars waged by the Baggara Janjaweed provided GOS with a 
convenient excuse for its various transgressions; this usually took a couple of forms. First, when 
Southerners were driven from their land by proxy militias, the GOS was able to deflect any 
responsibility (albeit transparently) by claiming the conflict was tribal in nature and consisted of 
disputes over land and resources and not part of a pattern of government aggression. While 
historically, competition for grazing land did occur, the recent phenomenon had been contrived 
by earlier regimes under the guise of economic necessity, and more recently continued with 
devastating results- as part of Bashir’s scorched earth policy. Also, neglecting his own human 
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rights violations and connected role in the conflict, Bashir could always point to the 
transgressions of the SPLA and the responsibility of Sudan, as a sovereign nation, to put down an 
unjust and illegal rebellion.   
By the new millennium, violence in Sudan threatened to emerge again with renewed 
intensity in the Western region of Darfur. The conflict in the south continued, but some progress 
had been made toward a peace plan between the NIF and SPLM/A.  However, those voices 
pushing for peace in the South, including the U.S., tended to conveniently overlook the 
connection of the overall conflict to what was transpiring in Darfur. Although there were 
obviously new dimensions to the conflict that would begin in the West, the inherent issue in 
Darfur, as in the South, was a government that did not represent the will of the Sudanese people. 
In fact, the NIF, by continuing with its martial, hegemonic practices, was not even representative 
of the Northern people.   Both the peace process in the South and the war in Darfur were clearly 
indicative of the overall flawed nature of Sudanese politics. 
The government in Khartoum, much like the other regions in Sudan, had long exploited 
Darfur and manipulated events there to suit its own needs, especially in its war against the South. 
In fact, Bashir exploited Darfur as a ripe recruiting ground for Janjaweed militias, who were then 
used to attack and drive Southerners from their lands.  Historically, there had always been 
tension between agrarian farmers and semi-nomadic herders, but these conflicts typically were 
settled by tribal leaders and did not take on the same racial dimension as the new ones.  In fact, 
up until the 1960’s, “Arab” and “African” were terms usually used to designate the difference 
between nomadic pastoralists and the more settled agrarian farmers.  
Although all segments of the region traditionally were viewed by Khartoum’s urban elite 
as backward
58, it was not until recent years, and especially under Bashir, that “Arab” as a racial 
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identification had been given its exalted status.  Although, due to centuries of intermarriage, it 
would be difficult to distinguish their physical characteristics, many in Darfur, with the 
government’s recent ethnic and religious rhetoric buzz, were still courted for political and 
military reasons. Politically “Arabs” in Darfur could provide the votes that were needed and 
enthusiastically joined the government- sponsored militias.    
However, with the split between Turabi and Bashir, government control over events in 
Darfur now threatened to spiral out of control. While the GOS had long used and exploited 
religious and racial differences in the region, using Janjaweed fighters for its own benefit, 
Turabi’s strong support in Darfur and neighboring Chad threatened to turn this effective tool 
against Bashir’s regime. In 1999, fearing the worst, Bashir dissolved the National Assembly and 
declared a state of emergency. In 2001, Turabi was arrested after his splintered Popular National 
Congress (PNC) signed an agreement of understanding with the SPLA.  The agreement, much 
like the NIF’s (now the National Congress Party -NCP) move toward the Comprehensive Peace 
Agreement (CPA), was more a bid in the struggle for power in Khartoum’s northern politics than 
a genuine attempt at peace.   
The government-sponsored Arab Janjaweed continued their attacks on non-Arabs in 
Darfur. Additionally, the government forces ignored the Arab transgressions while disarming 
African Darfurians. 
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  Bolstered by Turabi’s voice and better leadership overall, many who had 
suffered, now organized and armed themselves, demanding that the government disarm the 
Janjaweed and stop its neglect of the region. This move perhaps fulfilled Bashir’s worst fear, 
namely, the marshalling of Muslims in the region, chiefly the Fur and Zaghawa who identified as 
African, against his regime. In fact, 60% of the government forces in 2003 were Darfurians,
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making a government war against that region uncertain and costly. 
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The two main rebel groups that formed from this resistance were the Justice and Equality 
Movement (JEM), and the Sudanese Liberation Army (SLA). Sharing ethnicity and a common, 
as well as fluid, border with Sudan, many JEM supporters are now believed to have crossed into 
Sudan from bases in Chad
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 further complicating the war. Additionally, the SLA and JEM are 
both rife with internal divisions. Some militias that were aligned with the government switched 
sides to the rebels and vice versa with the result that “outsiders often found it difficult to tell who 
was fighting whom and for what reason.”62   
Nonetheless these groups have battled Bashir’s regime since 2003. Bashir, fearing his 
hold on power might slip, has viciously fought a war in return, utilizing both Arab proxy forces 
and indiscriminate bombing against civilians and the rebel forces. Government actions were 
largely responsible for the estimated 300,000 deaths in Darfur from February 2003 to December 
2004, with 25% of these attributed to non-violent acts, namely government blocking 
humanitarian aid to its citizens.
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  Such government actions were labeled genocide by Colin 
Powell in 2004. While Bashir’s regime in theory made peace with the South (the CPA was 
signed in 2005), the CPA was at time little more than a diversionary tactic while the government 
tried to secure its victory in Darfur. 
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CHAPTER THREE: THE US RESPONSE TO THE CONFLICT IN SUDAN: A 
CONVENIENT PEACE  
Despite its history of inaction in Africa, a few historians, for example, Peter Alan Bose, 
author of “U.S. Foreign Policy and Genocide in Sudan”, suggest that the United States’ response 
was unusually strong in Sudan. He commented further that America implemented a “full-court 
press of sanctions and public condemnations targeting [Sudan’s] ruling regime.”64 While the 
United States had indeed been active, previously under the Clinton administration, and then, as 
Bose indicates, under President George W. Bush, by issuing sanctions and public 
condemnations, that choice obscures the fact that these condemnations and sanctions, issued for 
more than a decade, amounted to little more than listless rhetoric.  In 2002, Senator Feingold of 
Wisconsin summed the situation up best exclaiming, “[F]finally, we are at a point at which we 
do not need to have another hearing to conclude that gross human rights abuses are committed 
regularly in Sudan.” 65 
 More troubling is that United States’ foreign policy, after years of pointing to 
Khartoum’s intransigency and brutality and after so much suffering in Sudan, culminated in a 
peace process that the United States had little or no faith in and a peace that in order to be 
successful, contrary to what most American policy makers believed, relied only on the good faith 
of the Sudanese government.  While the intractability of the Sudanese government was not the 
only obstacle to peace, it remained the main obstacle. Putting faith in the current Sudanese 
regime to effect change was politically expedient and conveniently veiled U.S. motivations to 
remain aloof of the crisis in Sudan, and offered little hope for a lasting peace. 
While on paper the momentous Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) signed in 2005 
in theory ended the war, the continued transgressions in the South made a mockery of this peace. 
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Additionally, the conflict in Darfur as well as the continued behavior of the NCP —which was 
connected to atrocities, even attempts at genocide — reflected Khartoum’s neglect and continued 
desire to dominate all regions of Sudan. The Los Angeles Times reported in September, 2008, 
that more than 2 million people in Darfur were still left homeless. Government attacks still 
continue on refugee camps where the government claims there remains a rebel presence. In 
August of the same year, the Times reported that in one camp, 31 people were killed, including 
17 women and children.
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 Another newspaper in October, 2008, quoted an international observer 
on the Darfur Peace agreement; that observer declared, “What peace process? I don’t see 
anything happening. The government has not even tried to implement the Darfur Peace 
Agreement. Not one move.”  In reference to disarming the Arab militias, this same observer 
noted, “[T]they started to give them [Arab militias] more weapons and send them out again.” 67 
Additionally, in the South, the general lull to informed observers, including those in the 
American government, represented more of an interim period between a pattern of all-out 
hostilities, than a move toward genuine peace. The National Congress Party (NCP) as it pursued 
war in Darfur gained a reprieve from total war in the South but still jockeyed for political and 
military advantage, as it ultimately wished to continue its practice of hegemony over that region. 
In fact, the only part of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) written by U.S. policy-
makers dealt with the valuable oil rich area of Abyei; this strategic area, an important piece in the 
power-sharing arrangement provided for in the CPA, was continually and blatantly violated by 
the NCP. A Congressional hearing in 2007 noted that government tankers extracted oil directly 
from wells, so the oil was not counted against the government’s percentage of the sharing 
agreement. Additionally, the report noted that Chinese and Malaysian oil companies were 
“aggressively developing oil with virtually no accountability.”68 The government continued to 
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use most of its new oil wealth to prepare for and wage further war in Darfur and along the 
Southern border. While the South has since gained its independence, many of these same 
violations still continue along the border of the Republic of South Sudan.     
These transgressions are but a drop in the bucket for why peace in Sudan, and between 
Khartoum and the Republic of South Sudan, under the current arrangement, will not ever work. 
Why had the United States supported a policy it does not believe in and one that has proven so 
ineffective? Throughout this chapter, I delineate a host of issues related to the peace process; the 
lack of faith the United States had in the NCP to enforce the peace, coupled with the lack of 
resources (both military and diplomatic) the United States devoted to the ending the crisis in 
Sudan, had become the norm. While there are of course expected nuances in U.S. policy (for 
example, post 9-11, the United States has engaged the NCP more directly) these changes in 
policy have had little to do with ending the crisis in Sudan or currently securing the tenuous 
border regions with the Republic of South Sudan.  Additionally, while there were many 
compassionate and knowledgeable voices in the United States government, overwhelmingly 
ending the conflict and humanitarian crisis in Sudan was not a key priority for. The United States 
indeed had little faith that the peace process would be successful. At the same time, the U.S. had 
not provided the essential material resources (i.e. peace keepers, diplomats, and monetary 
backing) for the peace to have a remote chance of succeeding. Additionally, the U.S. 
Government’s reliance on a humanitarian approach has proven to be ineffective — especially 
over the long term.  Asylum grants to those displaced, especially post 9-11, an area where the 
United States could assist without extending its full resources, has diminished in wake of the 
“War on Terror.” While America —in terms of relative budget— has never gone above and 
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beyond to aid the dispossessed of Sudan; in real terms, both budget dollars and asylum numbers 
hit historic lows following 9-11.  
Throughout history, war has spawned in the human imagination a hope for a new world 
in which coexistence and fairness are the norm. Despite this idealism, whether at Versailles, 
Vienna, or Addis Ababa, peace agreements, of course, are negotiated and written by individuals 
and nations, which even under the best of  circumstances are fallible and motivated more by self-
interest than flowery idealism and sometimes even retribution, i.e., Versailles.. However, few 
agreements in history, like the peace accords made in Sudan, seem to have been made with such 
contrary intentions and so little hope for true success.   
Since the 1950s, the United States has rarely used its full resources to bring about change 
in Africa. Even within the context of its Cold War global competition with the Soviet Union, 
when Africa did matter to the United States, the region mattered only enough for U.S. policy 
makers to formulate strategies that allowed the U.S. Government to remain aloof, diplomatically, 
politically, and militarily. Policy initiatives took various forms, ranging from CIA assassination 
plots to proxy wars and the support of various regimes (many of them nefarious) with money and 
weapons. The attention Africa received seemingly was driven by Cold War obligations rather 
than with true strategic or geo-political urgency.  While the post-Cold War world seemed to 
promise great change, it should not be surprising that American interest, already cursory without 
Cold-War threats, would diminish almost completely.  
Despite the overt conduct of the Sudan government, U.S. policymakers, while appalled at 
witnessing the crisis in Sudan, remained focused on Cold War concerns throughout the 1980s; 
the conflict within Sudan, although ghastly, existed only on the periphery of other interests. 
President Nimeiri’s opposition to Communist Ethiopia, which provided material support for the 
48 
SPLA, ensured that while the U.S. might condemn the government of Sudan’s (GOS) policy 
within its own borders, it would be unlikely to intervene strongly enough to halt the conflict and 
humanitarian crisis within Sudan. In fact, from 1983-1988, the United States was the largest 
donor of military aid to the GOS, providing $161.2 million in aid. 
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 This military support of the 
GOS, which continued under the al-Mahdi regime, revealed that America’s true motivations 
were their own Cold War concerns — not the Sudanese conflict.  While the U.S. did not seek to 
end the conflict the end of the decade, however, did signal a significant change in both the 
international and U.S. approach to the crisis.  
Although the end of the Cold War was the primary factor that guided American 
policymakers into the next decade, several notable events also played a role. First came the coup 
displacing al-Mahdi with the NIF in 1989, which indicated both an Islamist agenda and the 
hardening position of the government in Khartoum. Additionally, the American public was 
becoming increasingly aware of the humanitarian crisis unfolding in Sudan.  That attention was 
often garnered through a narrow lens, focusing on the displaced, or “Lost Boys” pursued by Arab 
horsemen. These accounts, according to Peter Brown, author of The Longest Journey: Resettling 
Refugees from Africa, played up the innocence of the “Lost Boys” and took on “mythical or 
Peter Pan” like qualities.70 While these portrayals could not realistically hope to capture the 
complexities of the war fully, they became inseparable from the changing motivations of the 
U.S. (and international) policymakers after the Cold War. 
The increased worldwide attention to the global tragedy of all displaced persons, 
especially internally displaced persons (IDPs) as well as the decreased concern for violations of 
sovereignty (now that world Communism had fallen at least its strongest proponent, the USSR), 
engendered a new paradigm for most international policymakers.  While the issue of sovereignty 
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and the rights of IDP’s were laden with international legal questions, increasingly the general 
view espoused was whether a regime responsible for terrible and frequent transgressions against 
its own citizens should keep the sacred right to sovereignty. The United Nations’ support of this 
doctrine became known as R2P, or Responsibility to Protect.  The new paradigm, coupled with 
American ascendance as the world’s sole superpower, offered a free hand and powerful 
opportunities of leverage to the United States which it had not previously enjoyed during the 
height of the Cold War.  
Despite these new circumstances, in the coming decade the U.S. would only selectively 
decide to use this new leverage, choosing instead to approach the Sudanese conflict not with its 
full resources but with humanitarian aid. While President George Bush Sr. stated that the 
rationale for an invasion of Panama in December of 1989 was to “defend democracy,” the 1989 
coup in Sudan, which placed the ruthless autocratic National Islamic Front (NIF) in power, did 
not garner nearly the same attention.  A withdrawal of American military aid to GOS, as well as 
humanitarian aid, namely financial support of Operation Life Line Sudan (OLS) and OLS II 
became the order of the day.  The difference between the Sudan and Panama, which garnered a 
strong, unilateral response, was that the United States clearly, even to the eyes of a casual 
observer, valued Panama, both with its strategic canal and its connection to Latin American drug 
trade, much more than the Sudan.    
However, the fall of Communism in Ethiopia in 1991, coupled with the NIF’s support of 
Iraq in the Gulf War, led to heightened American disapproval of the Bashir regime. Additionally, 
Sudan’s growing reputation (aside from its abject war record) of harboring and supporting 
terrorism would play a key role in the 1990s. The Iraq war and Panama demonstrated the 
tremendous capability of American policy when it chose to exert its  full diplomatic and military 
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resources; nonetheless while terrorism concerns would put Sudan on the American radar, the war 
in Sudan and the humanitarian disaster that continued there was still not a priority for the U.S.  
During the 1992 Presidential campaign, Bill Clinton argued that “American troops should 
not be sent into a quagmire that is essentially a civil war.”71  His sentiment was echoed by Colin 
Powell, still Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff then, and Defense Secretary William Cohen.  
Clinton could have been speaking directly to those advocating a more aggressive approach to 
halting the Sudanese conflict. Statistics from Clinton’s two terms in office clearly demonstrate 
that the President planned to fulfill his campaign promise of not involving American troops in a 
costly ground war. The chances of an American serviceman being killed by hostile action 
(during the Clinton years) while on duty were less than 1 in 160,000. He or she was fifty times 
more likely to die in an accident! 
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  Further, the chances of a serviceperson dying in an area of 
the world deemed insignificant to America’s geopolitical interests was virtually nil.    
The one exception to the Clinton policy was the Somalia intervention begun under the 
first President Bush.  The fact that such intervention in October 1993 (under Clinton) digressed 
into a debacle with significant action by the military that led to the deaths of eighteen American 
servicemen in Mogadishu, Somalia, obscures the basic limited goals that the United States had in 
that region at that time.  Somalia (a functioning country in name only) was ruled by warring 
warlords, each with a hand in delaying aid or intercepting it for its own purposes. Even accepting 
the most favorable policy goal

 of American intervention, which was declared to be “facilitating 
aid” for the U.S., this policy of providing or supervising the distribution of aid was at best 
                                                 
 An increasingly held view by scholars is that the impetus behind western Humanitarian initiatives is to prevent 
displaced persons from crossing international borders; typically displaced persons are housed in camps, which, 
dependent on aid, become static much like prisons.  This opinion, espoused by Cecil Dubernet and Alison Parker 
(addressed in Chapter 3) draws together further questions and concerns in regard to American policy.    
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providing but a temporary fix when a more durable solution was needed. American servicemen 
were not intended to be sacrificed to halt wars, dislodge rogue regimes, or rebuild nations at least 
now in East Africa; Somalia did not signal any revolutionary change for the way the White 
House would handle East Africa or Sudan in the future.  
No intervention was ever seriously considered in Sudan to halt the violence; but even a 
humanitarian intercession —like the one in Somalia— would be on a scale that would dwarf the 
operations in Somalia, then largely restricted to one city—Mogadishu. The death of the 
servicemen in Somalia did not garner East Africa more robust attention, but it definitely did lead 
the Clinton administration to become more cautious about any use of U.S. ground troops.  The 
next eight years did produce aggressive American responses under Clinton, but only in areas and 
situations that were deemed both of strategic importance and minimal risk to U.S. armed 
services. Both the Haitian intervention in 1994 and the later U.S. intervention in the Balkans in 
1999 represented different strategic points for U.S. policymakers. Consequently, ample 
American resources were considered for use only to bring events to a conclusion that was in 
accordance with American policy wishes.  Africa remained on a different plane of interest and 
thus, activity.  
The Sudanese conflict and the Rwandan genocide of 1994 seemed to cry out for action 
under the R2P doctrine. They fit its description and definition to a tee. Both scenarios, in their 
cost of human life and government complicity, dwarfed any other global crisis at that time and 
made a mockery of democratic ideals. However, both, as post-Cold War instances, were deemed 
of little significance to broader American interests.  Further, while receiving considerable media 
attention and humanitarian dollars, both scenarios lacked the military or diplomatic support and 
response garnered in either the Balkans or Haiti.  Moreover, and perhaps just as germane to 
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future American military excursions, was the fact the Balkan intervention was exercised through 
NATO and without U.N. approval. The American response was conducted despite placing a 
further strain on its relationship with China, a relationship then already at a low point.  America 
policymakers obviously had the wherewithal and confidence to act aggressively, even 
unilaterally, in any region of the world, but chose not to act in that capacity in Sudan.   
Of interest, too, was the fact that U.S. efforts, while achieving several strategic initiatives, 
failed to prevent the catastrophic humanitarian events unfolding in Serb-dominated areas 
concurrently. An estimated 30,000 Albanians were killed, and a million more lost their homes, 
the majority of which occurred after the American air campaign began.
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  However, the U.S. did 
halt the Serb advance and stabilized the dash to expand the ethnic borders within the former 
Yugoslavia, while also preventing the furtherance of war and refugee flows out of the Balkans—
all strategically important to the United States.  The insight gained, whether applied to the 
Balkans or Sudan, was that the United States, despite its strong rhetoric condemning those 
considered responsible for any humanitarian crisis, would still act in accordance with its own 
international strategic interests. An escalating war threatening European borders and that 
region’s stability and the proximity or the threat of refugees from Haiti,  the poorest country in 
the Western hemisphere, was enough to garner a U.S. military response, but a never-ending war 
in East Africa, a region rife with conflict and very fluid borders, was not. Ultimately, the United 
States would act militarily in Sudan, yet it was not the horrors of civil war that triggered an 
American military response but American concerns in regard to a growing terrorist threat in the 
region.  
Policy initiatives in Sudan existed in a different paradigm. Humanitarian aid had become 
the norm, but unfortunately, American troops, which could have been used to facilitate aid, were 
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not considered, especially after the Somalia fiasco. Economic and military sanctions were largely 
ineffective, as the Government of Sudan (GOS) gained even more profits from Sudanese oil in 
the wake of Chevron selling its shares. Humanitarian aid and sanctions provided only lip service 
to addressing the war; American antennae were more directly set to recognize the growing 
terrorist concern emanating from Sudan. 
The NIF/NCP

 had harbored Osama bin Laden from 1991-96 and was accused by the 
State Department, early during the Clinton administration of “exporting terror.”74  The dynamics 
of world diplomacy it seemed had shifted drastically, and international terrorism was now more 
of a focus for U.S. policy, as was tracking down Osama bin Laden.   In November, 1997, 
President Clinton issued Executive Order 13067, under the International Emergency Economic 
Powers Act (IEEPA), which declared a “national emergency with respect to Sudan,” and further 
stipulated, “The Regulations block all property and interests in property of the Government of 
Sudan, its agencies, instrumentalities, and controlled entities, including the Central Bank of 
Sudan.”75  
President Clinton described the impetus for these economic sanctions as being in 
opposition “to the actions and policies of the Government of Sudan, particularly its support of 
international terrorism and its failure to respect basic human rights, including freedom of 
religion.”76  While referencing the human rights abuses of GOS, it was not difficult to read 
between these lines and interpret the impetus of U.S. policy.  Future events would prove that 
although the United States would not overreach to stop the war in Sudan, it would approach any 
threats issuing from the potential of international terrorism more forcefully.     
                                                 
 The National Islamic Front was renamed the National Congress Party in 1998.  
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The Secretary of State, Madeleine K. Albright, in December, 1997, met with John 
Garang, head of the SPLA, marking the highest level of contact with the United States and 
Sudan’s rebels. Although the The New York Times reported that the meeting was, “intended to 
send a message to the Sudan’s Islamic Government that America supports the rebels’ efforts to 
establish democracy,”77 the meeting should not be viewed as a one hundred and eighty degree 
turn in U.S. policy. While Albright’s presence in the South sent a message that the United States 
would continue to support a more just settlement in Sudan and openly condemn the NIF, it was 
not prepared to interject itself more forcefully or breach sovereignty as it had in Yugoslavia, 
Somalia, and Iraq to prevent the advancement of the civil war in Sudan.   
In fact, Albright’s presence in Southern Sudan and the media attention devoted to it 
underscored the lack of serious effort being made by the United States in the 1980s and early 
1990s to establish lines of communication and put the warring parties on an equal playing field 
diplomatically. Albright’s voice and presence, while embarrassing for the NIF, in reality 
amounted to little more than lip service.  While condemnations were now coming from a higher 
authority, U.S. policy continued to be centered on humanitarian initiatives and mere verbal 
admonishment of the Sudanese government.  
On August 7, 1998, terrorists alleged to be connected with al-Qaeda and linked to Sudan 
largely through the efforts of bin Laden, killed and injured hundreds as U.S. embassies were 
attacked in Tanzania, and Kenya.  Two weeks later, the United States launched a cruise missile 
attack on a chemical factory in Sudan, allegedly involved (although that is still hotly disputed) in 
the production of materials for chemical weapons.  While U.S. policy would not intercede in 
Sudan to halt the civil war there or mitigate the humanitarian situation further, the U.S. would 
respond, as indicated by President Clinton, to an “imminent threat” to “our national security.”78 
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Whether the attacks on Sudan preserved national security or even were on target can be 
debated; hindsight, along with the complexities of a post 9-11 world, certainly encourages new 
and different interpretations. However, for the purposes of this investigation, what is important is 
not the legality or effectiveness of the U.S. policy against terrorism in Sudan, but rather to 
contrast its response—or nonresponse—to the actual actions of GOS and to a lesser degree those 
of the rebel groups, which when viewed under any objective lens have continued to commit acts 
which most would consider to be international crimes.  
The impetus for Executive Order 13067, despite the rhetoric, was clearly the evolving 
threat to American interests that Sudan’s support of terrorism presented. While the dynamics of 
world diplomacy had indeed shifted, the Clinton administration (after the maelstrom of dissent 
that accompanied its cruise missile attacks and in wake of the debacle in Somalia) was simply 
content to continue and target Sudan with both economic pressure and moral shaming for a 
hopeful effect.     
 For more than a decade preceding President Clinton’s order, war and the dispossession 
and death of thousands had unfurled in Sudan for the world to witness with no U.S. military 
response. Additionally, by 1990 with the NIF in charge, the Sudan government continued its 
policy of total victory, which when coupled with the increasingly fractured nature of the 
Southern rebels, only increased the callousness and destructiveness of the civil war. Clearly the 
missile strikes did little to prevent future bloodshed in this destructive war, but it did indicate a 
stronger U.S position as that position related to its own international interests.   
 Despite the consistently bleak appraisal of the Sudanese government and its policies, the 
United States did little more to increase its diplomatic presence in Southern Sudan or put more 
diplomatic pressure on the NIF. A decade after Albright’s “watershed” visit and meeting with the 
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SPLA, the United States still had only one diplomat in the South at a Juba consulate.
79
 GOS was 
clearly not fulfilling its promises to its citizens or the international community or meeting the 
needs of all its citizens, a clear reason to give opposition groups the diplomatic and material 
support they needed. However, Congressional rhetoric continued as did its inexplicable detached 
method of issuing legislation that did little but chronicle abuses and continue to admonish GOS 
from afar.     
The sanctions proposed served more as a public denunciation than as an effective 
impediment to stop the Sudan government’s war effort. A Congressional session for the 
Subcommittee on International Operations and Human Rights described the war through the 
1990s as a Government -driven “genocidal religious war,”80 which had turned the South into a 
“hell on earth,” killing an estimated 2,000,000 in the past decade. In 1998 alone, 100,000 died 
because the NIF denied humanitarian aid.
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Scholars have often debated how effective economic sanctions directed at Sudan actually 
are. Peter Brose suggests evidence that indicates U.S. sanctions have hurt Sudan economically, 
notably in the agricultural sector and its ability to refine oil.
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  Two questions can be posed then. 
First, if we agree sanctions have had an effect on the Sudan economy—at least its agricultural 
and oil sector—then how did these sanctions affect both the government’s ability and desire to 
wage war? The fact that war raged there throughout the 1990s clearly indicates that despite 
government rhetoric to the contrary, the government of Sudan (GOS) had every intention to 
conclude the crisis in its country militarily. Secondly, if sanctions did strain these industries, 
what impact did either sanction have on the ability to continue this conflict? The Government of 
Sudan has exploited the competition over Sudan’s resources and the access to land; this policy 
buttressed the government’s war effort by supporting its policy of proxy wars and added further 
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fuel to divisions within rebel groups who also compete for land and resources. The policy of 
divide and conquer, so ruthlessly promoted by Khartoum, has left a horrible legacy in both 
Sudan and the newly independent South.  These outcomes certainly can make the claim that 
economic sanctions had hamstrung the GOS war effort dubious at best.   
Although U.S. oil companies were barred from Sudan in 1997, a consortium of 
companies from various regions of the world eagerly filled that void; the Greater Nile Petroleum 
Operating Company (GNPOC) includes Talisman Energy of Canada, Petronas of Malaysia, 
China National Petroleum Corporation, and Sudapet, the Sudanese state oil company, with its 
modest 5% share. However, Khartoum received approximately 40% of the oil profits after a 
scheduled capital recovery.
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 It is of course no surprise that the NIF used this revenue to fund its 
war. In September, 2000, Congress claimed that revenue generated from the oil- funded GOS’s 
self-described “jihad,” highlighted the fact that limited economic sanctions actually had little 
impact on Sudanese policy.
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The more logical impetus for sanctions, much like their accompanying rhetoric, was to 
continue to present a moral stand against the Sudanese government’s war. To suggest that 
American policy was a failure with regard to Sudan under the Clinton Administration would be 
to assume that this Administration’s goal was to stop the war in Sudan. The evidence does not 
reflect this position. The most aggressive action the United States continued to take was directed 
toward Sudan’s link to international terrorism. Under pressure from the Saudi, Egyptian, and 
U.S. governments, Sudan expelled Osama bin Laden from Sudan in 1996, the same year that 
President Clinton suspended diplomatic relations with Sudan. The fact that bin Laden had 
already helped foster the logistical, and financial backing needed for future terrorist acts points to 
58 
a failure of America’s main policy initiative in Sudan, which was increasingly designed to 
prevent international terrorism, not stop the war going on there. 
As the bloodshed continued in Sudan, Congress discussed the Sudan Peace Act (S.1453) 
in September of 2000, a bill, which, among other things, condemned slavery and other human 
rights abuses perpetrated by Khartoum and expressed support for the Intergovernmental 
Authority on Development (IGAD), an East African- sponsored peace process. What should 
have been clear (and was to many in Congress), but was conveniently dismissed, was that the 
Sudan Peace Act, similar to the 1997 legislation, was absent of any full resolve and the full 
resources of the United States and was simply another verbal condemnation that would leave 
Khartoum with little practical motivation to change its policies significantly. 
While it is true that the peace process was pushed forward, true peace in Sudan suffered 
not from ignorance, but from political expediency. There were members of Congress who 
continued to speak out against the crimes in Sudan. The Chairman of the Subcommittee on 
International Operations and Human Rights, Christopher H. Smith,  and also Donald M. Payne, 
both Congressmen from  New Jersey, showed through their efforts and growing frustration at the 
lack of progress in Sudan a deep and sincere commitment to halting the bloodshed in Sudan. 
Payne, in order to push for actual tangible results and acknowledging there was  little progress, 
called for an amendment to  S. 1453 that would codify and put some teeth in the comprehensive 
sanctions the Administration placed on Sudan in November 4, 1997. Payne commented in 
September, 2000, that “as we debate the bill, many more people will die due to the National 
Islamic Fund Government’s deliberate and indiscriminate bombing of civilian targets, including 
hospitals and schools.”85 House Representative Thomas G. Tancredo added that the response in 
Sudan has not been commensurate with the crisis there and America has shown a lack of 
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“fortitude” in regard to its policy in the region.86  Despite clear acknowledgement of GOS abuses 
for more than a decade, the only thing Congress consistently accomplished with regard to this 
war was to detail the transgressions there and express its “polite” disapproval.  
With the dawn of the new millennium, oil revenues continued to flow into government 
war coffers. The Governor of Khartoum barred women from working in public places, and Omar 
al-Bashir was re-elected for another five years. These elections (boycotted by the main 
opposition parties, along with the actions of the GOS) to any objective observer should have 
pointed not to conciliation, but instead to a clear and continued pursuit by GOS to end the war 
using Machiavellian means. Despite that fact, continually recognized by Congress, U.S. policy 
continued to push forward with just a peace “plan,” Presently, the unresolved crisis in Darfur, the 
Nuba Mountains, and along the border of South Sudan, as well as the human rights violations 
committed by the NCP, reflect the continued hegemonic practices of Khartoum. 
Newly elected President George W. Bush, looked early in his tenure like he would 
address the crisis by appointing Senator John Danforth as a Special envoy to Sudan on 
September 6, 2001, with the aim of pressuring both sides to end the conflict. Bush also signaled 
to the NCP (formerly the NIF) that the United States would begin normalizing relations once 
peace was actually achieved. 
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 While Bush’s early decision at least put the war in Sudan on the 
radar, Bush, like the previous administration, would only count on the good faith of the NCP as a 
condition for peace, a decision that points to the weakness of the approach.  The threat of 
continued sanctions also remained an ineffective strategy overall.   
The peace process simplistically included only the NCP and the SPLM, as opposed to 
dealing with the diverse political factions in the North and rebel groups in the South. Any 
approach to peace that identified only the desires of a corrupt regime in Khartoum and was not 
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even representative of the North was flawed. The South and other regions of Sudan, including 
shortly in a very palpable way the Darfur region, would demand a voice. However, these were 
only issues IF American policy makers seriously believed their efforts (or their current peace 
plan) would actually end the war. While American rhetoric, when taken at face value, claimed its 
aim was to end the war, actual policy initiatives continued to point to a more limited goal.  
The crisis in Sudan required a complete renovation. The Bush administration stepped up 
its rhetoric and assigned special envoy Danforth the role of pressuring both major combatants to 
make peace.  However, the new administration’s efforts proved to be merely window dressing. 
Unfortunately, the thin veneer offered by the current peace plan could not mask a house decaying 
from within. In spite of the continued despair and futility that permeated any prospects for real 
peace in Sudan, the war and humanitarian crisis was pushed even further back on the American 
agenda after the horrific attacks of 9-11.  
Perhaps no one has captured Washington’s unrestrained, even obsessive, resolve to keep 
America safe after 9-11 better than Jane Mayer, author of The Dark Side: The Inside Story of 
How The War on Terror Turned into a War on American Ideals.  While it is not necessary for the 
purposes of this investigation to demonstrate that the Bush administration was “obsessed” or 
operated on the “Dark Side,” certain evidence does suggest that the horrific attacks of 9-11 did 
alter U.S. policy initiatives in Sudan and did move that conflict further down the U.S. priority 
list.  
The Bush White House was made up of individuals, neo-conservatives, such as Dick 
Cheney, Donald Rumsfeld, and Paul Wolfowitz, who, along with President Bush, believed that 
American military power could be used to re-shape the world according to their own interests. 
Prior to 9-11, within the first months in office, it became clear that President Bush would act 
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alone, with or without the approval of American allies or the U.N.  A senior Bush official called 
this unilateral action, which essentially forced American allies to accept its agenda, “the doctrine 
of integration.”88 Additionally, regime changes that benefited American interests or extinguished 
a threat to the U.S. and were deemed practical, that is without long term deployments were 
promoted.  These core principles, known as the “Bush Doctrine,” would be the driving force 
behind foreign policy during the Bush years.    
George W. Bush also campaigned on the promise that American troops would not be 
used for “open ended deployments” or “nation-building” and would be used to “fight and win 
wars”89 The Bush White House had to be aware that the conflict in Sudan could not be quickly 
remedied.  The fact that Sudan, or ending its war, were not considered geo-politically paramount,  
made the likely hood of a long term American commitment, especially militarily or in personnel, 
unlikely.     
Bush’s comments in regard to American military commitments are revealing.  The swift 
military victories in Iraq and Afghanistan after 9-11 were followed by what appeared to be 
inadequate or inept planning for nation building in either country.  The budget of the State 
Department (vital to diplomacy and long term durable solutions) under the Bush White House 
was meager: in 2003, $26 billion, or just 6 percent of the defense budget. By 2008, it was $42 
billion or just 6.5 percent of the defense budget.
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  The bulk of these diplomatic dollars, as 
insufficient as they were, would be allocated for areas considered strategic: Iraq, Afghanistan, 
and Pakistan. The crisis in Sudan, not considered vital to winning the war on terror, barely 
registered diplomatically.   Despite the lack of far-sightedness or commitment to diplomacy, or 
perhaps because of it, the Bush White House did devote the bulk of its budget to militarily 
fighting “terrorism.”  
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 To win the “war on terror” the Bush White House promised America’s full resources; 
commensurately, “all other global issues were subsumed in a monolithic view of fighting 
terrorism.” 91  In 2001 the U.S. defense budget was $293 billion.  In 2008, it reached a staggering 
$647 billion, by which time the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan were expected to have cost more 
than $1 trillion. 
92
 “The Bush Doctrine,” used as a rationale for the invasion of Iraq and 
Afghanistan, seemingly gave the United States carte blanche anywhere in the world. Sudan’s 
recent history of harboring terrorists was definitely of interest to the Bush administration. 
However, the United States could afford to leave the NCP in power due to the nature of each 
nation’s primary policy goals: The NCP, like the regimes before it, continued to hold as its 
principal objective Khartoum’s hegemony over the rest of the nation.  While promoting Islamic 
fundamentalism had seemingly been part of the NCP’s agenda in the past, government rhetoric 
was more based on political strategy

 and less on pure religious fanaticism.  Nonetheless, the 
horrific attacks on the U.S. Embassy in Kenya in 1998 and the attack on the USS Cole in 
October of 2000, were both tied to al-Qaida, and linked to the Sudanese government due to its 
policy of harboring terrorists, including bin-Laden, throughout the decade of the nineties.   
International terrorism and the eventual catastrophic terrorist attacks of 9-11, relative to 
the humanitarian crisis and war in Sudan, placed American policy in regard to Khartoum on a 
much more dire level.  However, since winning the war in the South and settling the crisis 
                                                 
 The orthodoxy amongst scholars in the field is that the Sudanese government, historically and through successive 
regimes, has manipulated both racial and religious discourse to control politics and power within the state.  
Oluwarare Agunda , author of “Arabism and Pan- Arabism in Sudanese Politics”, claims that race, the formation of 
the dominant “Arab”, also connected to Islam through the Arab language is not a biological fact but a racial 
construct that has been used, even prior to the nations inception, to create a severe class hierarchy in Sudan. Michael 
Kevane and Leslie Gray, authors of “Local Politics in the time of Turabi’s Revolution”, extend this analysis to the 
local level where individuals used government rhetoric, despite previously being racially or religiously tolerant, to 
advance themselves politically and economically in their communities at the expense of individuals whose 
background or behavior does not meet the expectations of what it means to be a proper “Arab” or “Muslim”.       
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already fermenting in Darfur and not promoting Islamic fundamentalism were the main goals of 
the NCP, the Sudanese government could be (in fact had to be based on the hardening of the 
American position) more pliable when it came to international terrorism. Additionally, crushing 
opposition to Khartoum’s policies, which in Darfur was linked to Hassan al-Turabi, a man 
known for his erudite and fiery Islamist rhetoric as well as his connection to bin-Laden, would 
satisfy the needs of American policy makers as well as the NCP. Consequently, the NCP and the 
United States, which did not feel ending the war in Sudan was necessary to combat terrorism, 
could move forward with their primary policy goals intact.   
The gravity of America’s new direction in Sudan was not missed by the NCP. The arrest 
of Hassan al-Turabi at the instigation of President Bashir in February, 2001, suggested that the 
NCP was responding to American pressure and clamping down on radical Islam.  However, the 
arrest of Turabi, although a propaganda win for America’s counter- terrorism agenda, upon 
closer inspection revealed the same troubling aspects  regarding  U.S. policy, as well as the 
nature of politics within Sudan.  
Turabi had not only recently broken with Bashir, but his new political group, the Popular 
National Congress (PNC), had signed a memorandum of understanding with the SPLM. 
Realizing the potential for a new threat emanating from Darfur, already a strong base of Turabi 
support, Bashir was quick to arrest Turabi.  The arrest of Turabi, formerly an advisor and 
confidant to bin-Laden and now a thorn in the side of Khartoum, was a boon both to the NCP 
and United States. Regardless of Turabi’s radical background, his arrest was a sure sign that 
Khartoum was not serious about a representative government and wanted to continue its same 
hegemonic practices.   
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The arrest, followed by the signing of the Sudan Peace Act in October, 2002, 
demonstrated where U.S. interests lay.  The peace act, while on the surface seemingly strong (the 
term genocide was connected to GOS actions), delivered the same two-fold response to the 
Sudanese conflict as before: namely, condemn GOS and make superficial attempts to facilitate 
peace.  The conflict in Sudan, which had always been subordinate to other geo-political 
concerns, was to be relegated even further under the Bush’s administration.   Months after the 
September 11
th
 attacks, voicing the change in policy emphasis, the Assistant Secretary of State 
for African Affairs, Walter Kansteiner, stated America’s “first [goal], of course is to deny 
terrorists’ use of Sudan as a safe haven.”93 
 The Sudan Peace Act also signaled that the United States would not contemplate a 
regime change through application of the “Bush Doctrine.” Although an unsavory choice, 
leaving Bashir in power ensured that a regime more disposed to promoting terrorism would not 
enter the regional equation.  More radical elements like Turabi represented an unknown; by 
keeping to the status quo, the U.S. knew what it was getting with Bashir.  America, prior to 9-11, 
under both Clinton and G.W. Bush, never seriously considered stronger support of rebel groups 
within Sudan. Attempting to prop up rebel groups now— a clear change in policy—could have 
the potential to destabilize the country further, thus creating a situation where radical Islam and 
the threat of terrorism might flourish.  Bashir’s “at- all- costs” approach to winning the civil war, 
coupled with America’s exclusive focus on terrorism after 9-11, meant that Bashir could 
continue his war without further impediment as long as he cooperated on the terror front.    In 
fact, despite the regimes past connections to terrorism, the level of cooperation garnered from 
Bashir’s regime led the CIA to consider its Sudanese counterpart, Mukhabarat, an important 
source of counterterrorism intelligence. 
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This relative détente between the U.S. and the NCP produced a scenario where both 
governments could accomplish their goals.  Bashir, by cooperating with the CIA and American 
policy makers and paying lip service to the peace process, could be assured that the war in Sudan 
would continue to receive only condemnation and light sanctions from Washington. In turn the 
U.S. could devote its full resources to the war on terror while still continuing to publicly 
pronounce it was doing something to stop the war in Sudan.  
The contradiction of actually negotiating a peace with the NCP was not missed on 
Senator Bill Frist of Tennessee, who remarked, “[S]should we believe they [NCP] are serious at 
this point about these commitments in the first place?” 95 The futility of the path in regard to the 
direction of U.S. policy could not either—as some historians suggest—be explained away simply 
by American ignorance of the realities on the ground. Ken Isaacs would testify before Congress 
and detail all the complexities and nuances of the war, in short, suggesting, “The war is not just 
about Islam versus Christianity, the War is not just about race, the war is not just about oil.”96  
Isaacs’s testimony was not an aberration.   
Congress increasingly was fed a steady diet of how complex the situation in Sudan was 
and how difficult peace under those conditions would be.  The government in Khartoum 
continued to be the catalyst for the war. However, the intricacies of the crisis, created or 
exacerbated by Khartoum’s hegemonic practices, would have to be dealt with for peace to have 
even a small chance of success. Perhaps foremost of these concerns were the disparate groups, 
opposed both in the South and Darfur, to NCP rule.   Again, despite the many compassionate 
voices heard in Congress and the various supportive interest groups, the brutal reality was that 
American policy makers were not prepared to devote the necessary attention and resources to 
Sudan to affect actual change. The fact that these complexities were ignored and only the NCP 
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and SPLM were being approached underscored the politically expedient path being taken in 
Sudan.   
While the United States was devoted to winning the war on terror, the Sudanese 
government, despite its rhetoric to the contrary, continued its acts of aggression.  Government 
hostility in the Upper Nile became more acute, and the situation in Darfur was about to explode. 
By February, 2003, the Sudanese Liberation Movement and Army (SLM/SLA) and the Justice 
and Equality Movement (JEM), in their response to continued Janjaweed attacks and due to the 
inherent inequities in the Sudanese state, announced their existence. The battles that ensued, 
pitting the rebels against government troops and its proxies, were brutal, often ravaging civilians 
and soldiers alike.   
The war in Darfur was also complex.   The most pressing concern for the United States 
was that the unrest and anarchy in Darfur might allow radical Islam to take hold.  JEM was 
allegedly linked to Hassan al-Turabi.  Turabi’s fiery Islamist rhetoric, and the threat he posed to 
Khartoum, made his arrest by the NCP a foregone conclusion.  There were regional concerns 
too: the SLM and JEM had strong ethnic ties to Chad, making the border between Sudan and 
Chad an artificial one, as supplies, arms and fighting breached it with regularity.  Further 
exacerbating the complexities and intensity of the conflict were the incendiary tactics by the 
NCP, which sought to exploit the (perceived) racial element of the crisis. While the rebels in 
Darfur were Islamic, the government often used its rhetoric to promote a division between the 
“African” rebels (JEM and SLM), and their “Arab” neighbors.    
Rebel victories elicited a scorched earth policy by Bashir as a response. It is estimated 
that from February to December, 2003, 300,000 died in Darfur; 25% of these deaths were due to 
the government blocking aid.
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  The violence continued into the next year and triggered a new 
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wave of diplomacy. In 2004, both the UN and Congress labeled the violence in Sudan genocide. 
President Bush made his first public acknowledgement of the crisis in Darfur on April 7
th  
and 
Kofi Annan and Colin Powell both made high profile visits to Sudan. 
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 Additionally, in June, 
2004, the United Nation Security Council (UNSC) passed Resolution 1556, which blamed NCP 
for the violence, but did little else. 
Despite tough language, the above rhetoric by the United States and UN led to a 
humanitarian emphasis in Sudan and little else. Peace conveniently remained something that 
diplomats were willing to talk about, but not truly invest in fully.  The dialogue in Congress 
reflected the contradictory and politically expedient path that the peace process was taking.  The 
NCP, essentially the engine behind the brutal conflict, was viewed in Congress as simply a 
“pariah”, an “illegal government” that “cannot be trusted,” and then somehow also viewed as the 
agent that could facilitate peace in Sudan.
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  When asked if this approach was merely 
“nonsensical,” Colin Powell replied, “No, it’s not nonsensical at all. Since they turned it on, they 
can turn it off.”100  Additionally, UNSC Resolution 1556 condemned the NCP, stating that 
“[T]the Government of Sudan bears the primary responsibility to respect human rights”, while 
also “welcoming the commitment by the Government of Sudan to investigate the atrocities and 
prosecute those responsible.”101  These repeated accusations, coupled with the hope that the NCP 
would change, a hope that few believed would actually occur, demonstrated the almost 
schizophrenic nature of the peace process.   
In May, 2004, while expressing the cursory nature of the peace process at a 
Congressional hearing, Representative Edward Royce of California stated that the peace process 
was “doomed” and “everyone was focused on that doomed peace process instead of on the 
killings that were going on.”102 While the peace process and American dollars (mainly for 
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humanitarian initiatives) at least offered the guise of moral credibility, the decisions made post 9-
11 continued to reflect a policy wherein the Sudanese conflict, if it did matter, lay far removed 
and on the periphery of important policy issues . Although many compassionate voices still 
issued a clarion call in Congress, clearly lamenting the loss of life in Sudan and the lack of will 
on the part of GOS to pursue real peace, the chief concern for United States policy (as that policy 
specifically related to Sudan and the world) was now the ongoing threat of worldwide terrorism.   
For those in Congress who pointed out the obvious contradiction and the absurd nature of 
placing the prospects of peace in the hands of the NCP, a clear necessity was to get the people on 
the ground at least to give peace or compliance to the treaty a chance. However, after 9-11,  the 
United States still could only commit itself to sending a single 15- person group to the North and 
one 10- person group to the South to monitor the “zones of tranquility”, that were part of the 
previous ceasefire agreement.  This action was hardly sufficient to monitor an area of land 
approximately 3 ½ times the size of Texas!
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 Lack of a U.S. and international presence continue 
to be cause for concern in Sudan and along the border with South Sudan. The lack of faith in 
Congress, coupled with the lack of resources being devoted to any impending peace, was a clear 
sign that political expediency was the accepted order of the day in Sudan.  
While the United States tied its policy halfheartedly to what can only be called an 
ephemeral peace initiative in Sudan, America’s “War on Terror” received full backing from the 
U.S. materially, militarily, and monetarily. In terms of budget requirements for the wars in Iraq 
and Afghanistan, the U.S. alone had spent, since the inception of these wars, (as of 2008) more 
than $1 trillion.
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  These figures do not include the expenditures associated with more general 
counter-terrorism initiatives.  At the same time, the U.S. budget climbed to meet these initiatives, 
Donald Payne of New Jersey, a member of Congress since 1988, lamented the drying up of funds 
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reserved for Africa.  The assistance to all of Africa targeted in 2005 at $330 million (a figure not 
met) was a mere fraction of the total monies devoted to the “War on Terror.”105 
It was under these circumstances that the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) was 
signed on January 9, 2005.  The CPA, also known as the Naivasha Agreement, was the 
culmination of years of work and smaller agreements. The first of those, the Machakos Protocol, 
was signed in July, 2002, and saw the signatories, the SPLM and NCP, agree to resolve the 
conflict peacefully as well as agreeing to the principle of self- determination for Southern Sudan.  
Perhaps most importantly, the Protocol set in place a broader framework and avenue to continue 
discussions that eventually led to the culminating peace signed in Kenya in 2005.  An ongoing 
peace process was set in motion and mediated by the Intergovernmental Authority on 
Development (IGAD), made up of several East African nations. This IGAD -brokered peace was 
strongly backed by the United States under the Bush Administration as well as the UN and the 
African Union (AU). 
To those unfamiliar with the Sudanese conflict, the CPA offered the guise of a legitimate 
opportunity for peace and appeared to be a boon for American foreign policy. The document 
seemed to pave the way for democracy and peace, a potentially striking achievement considering 
that Sudan had been ravaged for decades by internecine war. Furthermore, while the United 
States did not shout it from the rooftops, the CPA had in effect legitimized the rule of al-Bashir, 
thus ensuring cooperation between the NCP and United States on the terror front would continue.      
In short, the CPA a few major stipulations. First, a power- sharing agreement which 
would give the SPLM autonomy in the South, while ensuring an Islamic legal system based on 
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Shari ‘a in the North. Additionally, a 2011 referendum would decide whether the South would 
remain part of Sudan or a separate entity; that referendum would be preceded by a Government 
of National Unity (GNU) to encourage unity by giving the SPLM a new, substantial role in 
Khartoum’s government. A new Government of Southern Sudan (GoSS) was also to be formed. 
Second, wealth Sharing was another key provision of the CPA. Per the agreement, half of all oil 
revenues drawn from the South would be transferred to the coffers of the newly formed GoSS.  
Next, the security arrangements to enforce the ceasefire were to be organized under the Ceasefire 
Joint Military Committee (CJMC.) Members of the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the 
SPLA, recognized as the only two legal militias by the CPA, were to meet on a bi-weekly basis 
to assess demobilization and reorganization of troops. Last, the CPA also looked to deal 
proactively with the contentious regions, or so-called “Three areas,” which referred to the 
historically neglected regions of Southern Kordofan/Nuba Mountains, Blue Nile and Abyei.
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While the former two regions were given autonomous status in the North, the oil rich region of 
Abyei proved to be more complicated and was eventually addressed by an outside commission. 
National Elections were scheduled for 2009 and did take place, albeit with many objections from 
the various groups that were not represented in the peace agreement.    
The CPA was hardly a panacea for Sudan’s ills. The chaos and violence continued in 
Sudan, and hostilities in Darfur renewed with ferocity in 2006, which by many, including Colin 
Powell and President Bush, were described as genocide.  The evidence of a failed peace was 
overwhelming almost immediately.  News reports, aid workers, victims on the ground, the ICG, 
the United Nations, as well as Congress—in explicit detail—laid out the stark truth about the 
                                                 
 The South voted for its independence, becoming the Republic of South Sudan in July of 2011.   
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situation in Sudan, which sadly continued to spiral downward into anarchy. The recent 
independence of the South, presented often by the media with finality as the last step to ending 
the crisis, may only further diminish American attention and resources. For example, in the Nuba 
Mountains (one of the three contentious areas addressed in the CPA) peace continues to be 
elusive while the transgressions of President al-Bashir receive little attention in the American 
media or government.  Al-Bashir has supported the controversial and disputed election of Ahmed 
Haroun, a man wanted by the International Criminal Court on over 40 charges for war crimes 
and crimes against humanity.
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  Haroun’s recent election as governor of South Kordofan, home 
to the Nuba Mountains, a region where more than two million died
108
 as a result of Khartoum’s 
genocidal war policies over a twenty year period, reveals that the CPA has not achieved what it 
promises on paper - real peace.   Demonstrating his steadfast desire to continue Khartoum’s 
hegemony at any cost, al-Bashir has even threatened those that resist the election results in South 
Kordofan with starvation.
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Even if the CPA had received the full backing and vigilance of the United States and the 
international community, the agreement would still be a challenge to enforce.  The violence, 
endemic now for decades, continues in Sudan because of an inherent flaw in Sudanese society—
a lack of true representative government that has not been corrected by the CPA. As agreed to in 
CPA, the NCP received 52% of the vote in the GNU, leaving Khartoum’s government 
effectively in the hands of the NCP. The CPA also excluded other opposition groups from the 
GoSS, which is dominated by the SPLM, which holds a 70% majority. Non-SPLM Southern 
Sudanese groups receive a fraction (6%) of representation in the GoSS.
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  The true figures are 
perhaps even more unbalanced, as the most recent elections, according to the Carter Center, 
“were not up to international standards” as many “parties withdrew [in protest] from the 
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election.”111  The decision to move forward with two political parties as signatories to the CPA, 
essentially excluded millions of  Sudanese, many of whom viewed Sudan’s inherent issue as one 
of exclusion, which while expedient, was very  questionable in terms of a durable and long-
lasting  solution. Even after the independence of the South, issues of fair representation, a 
problem fostered—not corrected— by the CPA continue to be an impediment to a true and 
lasting peace.  
 Additionally, while CPA brokers chose to deal with Darfur through other avenues, many 
in the region viewed their situation, albeit with different nuances, as being similar to the 
Southern region which had been battered and subjugated at the hands of the Sudanese 
government. The question for why and how Darfur was left out of the CPA understandably is 
hard to determine and reconcile.  These flaws, considering the epicenter of the conflict currently 
in Darfur, are numerous. On September 20, 2008, Human Rights Watch compared the situation 
in Darfur to a “violent scramble for power and resources involving government forces, 
Janjaweed militia, rebels and former rebels, and bandits.” 112  Internal divisions in the Sudan 
Liberation Army (SLA), attacks against humanitarian convoys, and armed clashes with the 
Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) have only exacerbated the conflict further. The actions of 
these rebel groups have also drawn the ire of international leaders. Following the roadside 
attacks in October of 2008 on humanitarian convoys, Moscow condemned the rebel actions as 
“unprecedented acts of terrorism.”113 Additionally, the Los Angeles Times reported that rebel 
camps “are awash with weapons.” 114  
However, the above acts might be more properly viewed as an outcome of government 
policy and Khartoum’s neglect of its citizenry;  the NCP’s repeated violations of human rights 
was inevitably going to create this type of response in the region. The NCP, in the words of the 
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ICG, has become an “expert” in divide and rule tactics.115 Congress noted in 2008 that 
“Khartoum’s policy in Darfur has been the same tactic they used in the South: to divide and 
destroy.”116 The fractures among the resistance groups in Darfur, as well as in the South, often 
are used as propaganda by Khartoum, which readily adopts the language used by the United 
States post 9-11. Actions in Darfur and the South are simply attributed to “terrorists” or 
“bandits” who are resisting the rule of law.  While al-Bashir’s transformation from being a tyrant 
to a peace-minded sovereign has been more readily accepted within the African Union, in 
Congress, those closest to the situation, remain unconvinced.  In fact, the transcript of a 2008 
Hearing by the Committee on Foreign Relations in the United States Senate reads much like an 
indictment against the NCP.  Then Senator Joe Biden noted that these attacks continue “driving 
90,000 from their homes” while noting that the “biggest obstacle to peace” seemed to be the 
“Sudanese Government.” 117  
While this knowledge can be construed as an example of political insight on the part of   
U.S. policy makers, American awareness of Khartoum’s position and its continued willingness to 
work with the Bashir regime, both through the CPA and the War on Terror, remains the biggest 
obstacle to progress in the region. Given the complexities in both Darfur and the South, 
especially regarding the myriad rebel groups whose actions often create a lawless climate, the 
United States could be forgiven for moving forward with a more simplistic formula for peace in 
the region – many peace accords historically have taken this approach. However, the fact that the 
NCP is a large part of the political equation does appear to remain counter-intuitive in terms of 
finding a lasting, durable solution to the Sudan crisis. The aggressive actions by the NCP in the 
summer of 2011 along the border of South Sudan in Abyei and the continuing human rights 
74 
violations in Darfur and the Nuba Mountains exemplifies the futility of placing the stability of 
the region in the hands of Khartoum.   
The commonly held view in Congress continues to be that the NCP has not changed, 
cannot be trusted, and is not serious about power sharing.  Khartoum’s approach to the CPA at 
least on the surface appeared to “confirm a calculated political positioning rather than any real 
commitment to unity” and “the NCP’s agreement with the SPLM appears to be the latest strategy 
for securing its power against such challenges.”118  The government’s blatant misuse of the CPA 
to win the war in Darfur has kept the region awash in blood. Congress reported that “atrocities” 
routinely occur and tens of thousands are driven from their homes.
119
 Locals in Darfur have 
commented in October, 2008, that Sudanese forces launched “very heavy ground and air attacks 
on villages in North Darfur”, and al-Bashir is alleged to have unleashed Arab militias or 
Janjaweed, prompting one international observer to ask, “What peace process? I don’t see 
anything happening.”120 Additionally, the LA Times in 2008 quoted U.S. special envoy to Sudan, 
Richard Williamson, as condemning the Sudanese government’s “pattern of violence” in the 
region. 
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  While the all-out campaign against the South stayed on hold, shifting the 
government’s focus to Darfur, Khartoum continued to effectively work to disrupt the peace 
process in the South.   
The LA Times on September 22, 2009, reported that ethnic fighting and militia attacks on 
villages in the South have increased, possibly leading to as many as 2,000 deaths and the 
dispossession of 200,000. The majority of these attacks targeted women and children. 
Government officials in Southern Sudan claim that the NCP is secretly arming Southern tribes in 
an effort to undermine the CPA prior to the 2011 referendum. 
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  Although the violence was 
sometimes attributed to rival Southern parties’ jockeying for control of oil, the problem can be 
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more precisely traced to the lack of follow through by the NCP on key stipulations of the CPA.  
Additionally, government anxiety about the approaching 2011 referendum increased with the 
untimely death of SPLM/A Head, John Garang, on July 30, 2005. Garang, who wielded 
tremendous clout in both the North and the South, had tenaciously clung to a strategy of a united 
Sudan.  His replacement, the new GoSS President SalvaKiir, was more committed to a path 
toward independence, thus only increasing the uncertainty about Sudan’s future and the NCP’s 
desire to uphold the CPA.  
In retrospect it appears the NCP has acquiesced, allowing the South to separate from 
Sudan in the summer of 2011. However, for more than two decades, al-Bashir has been savvy 
enough to measure risk and reward, while keeping the NCP’s major war aims intact. Dating back 
to the renewal of the conflict in 1983, Khartoum has typically focused through its proxy wars 
and scorched earth policy on securing strategic oil and farm land that exist on the border lands 
between North and South. Al-Bashir had to realize that America might feel obligated to respond 
to a flagrant declaration that he would not let the South go; al-Bashir perhaps has understood too, 
that as long as he continued to give lip service to the peace process (giving the U.S. what it 
wanted) he would lose the complete subjugation of the South—an unrealistic military goal that 
has not been accomplished in more than half of a century—but keep the more immediate war 
aim which was to secure the strategic border zones. Prior to the 2011 referendum, the apparent 
willingness of the NCP to obstruct the CPA was not missed in Congress.  
“Can we discuss peace with a government that is involved in genocide?”123 This question 
asked by Congressman Donald Payne of New Jersey, underscores more than a decade of 
knowledge and insight into the nefarious behavior of the NCP. Unfortunately, the answer, 
despite the reproach of Bashir, and the NCP, remains “yes.”  Better wisdom should have dictated 
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that the United Sates gear its policy, given the limitations of the CPA, toward compliance via a 
stiffer resolve, as sanctions had been of little use. Unfortunately, given the track record of the 
NCP, the U.S. position not to offer adequate ground level resources appears unconscionable.   
On January 24, 2007, a Congressional report titled, South Sudan: The Comprehensive 
Peace Agreement on Life Support stated in clear terms just how little had been accomplished 
toward implementing the major components of the CPA.  First, the assessment and monitoring of 
the CPA had been woeful. The area that was most concerning was Abyei. The CPA stipulated 
that the fate of this disputed oil-rich area would be ultimately decided by referendum, but the 
report noted also that “the Government of Sudan is withdrawing its troops from less strategic 
areas only to redeploy them in border areas where oil is produced.” Additionally the government 
bypassed the 50/50 sharing arrangement by siphoning gas from the region.
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  The United 
Nations Mission in Sudan (UNMIS) reported that “little progress has been made and oil revenues 
remain a shrouded and controversial issue.” Additionally, Salva Kiir allegedly stated that “if the 
SPLM is to go back to war, it will be over Abyei.”125  In 2005, the United States pushed to 
replace The African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS), essentially an AU force, with a more 
effective UN force, but offered up little of its own manpower to accomplish the task.  
Ironically, while the United States wrote the text concerning Abyei in the CPA and while 
it is the wealthiest member of the UN, it  has committed little in terms of monitors or assessment 
teams – an area that a recent Congressional report viewed as key to enforcing, not just the  power 
-sharing arrangement, but essentially the entire peace process. By 2006, the United States still 
had not dedicated a single full-time diplomat to the Sudan peace.
126
  
Three years after the CPA was signed, members of Congress in 2008 were still asking the 
same question, “What is delaying the deployment of the full complement of 26,000 peace 
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keepers and police?” While addressing the lack of air support, a member of Congress added, 
“[W]we are all befuddled why we can’t find 24 helicopters in a significant arsenal of the world’s 
leading military powers.”127 In keeping with its pattern of obstruction, the Sudan Tribune in 2006 
quoted a leading member of the NCP comparing the UN and peacekeeping forces to 
“invaders.”128 Apparently the powerful nations of the world, including the United States, were 
not prepared to push the issue or did not want to push the issue.  
  Additionally, although in theory the CPA included the SPLM as supposedly an equal 
partner, the United States had only one diplomat in Juba as late as 2008.
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  Another 
Congressional report in 2007 stated that “[A]as limited and underfunded as it may be,” a 
humanitarian emphasis in Africa, without “committing diplomatic resources.” is a prime reason 
for the failure of U.S. and international policy in Sudan.
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   While this humanitarian emphasis is 
a theme to be addressed in Chapter Four here, the lack of resources committed to the peace 
process by the United States was indeed telling. 
Numerous studies have indicated there were severe problems with the Sudan peace 
process, most agreeing that the key measures of the CPA – a national census, formation of a 
unified army and demarcation of a North-South border –were not implemented.  The damning 
2007 Congressional report, “CPA on Life Support,” indicated several key issues, all which could  
be temporarily remedied with more on- the- ground resources and greater diplomatic initiative by 
the United States, indicating (1) assessment and monitoring not implemented, (2) no progress on 
wealth and power sharing -as well, (3) the North and South borders still unresolved. While those 
key issues remained unresolved and certainly were troubling, the inherent flaw in the process 
continued to be that clearly little faith could be placed in the NCP. Ironically, this situation was 
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the elephant in the room. Congress had chosen to speak openly about Sudan for more than a 
decade and unfortunately continued to both condemn and sustain the NCP position.   
Peace cannot be dependent on a change in Khartoum because none will be forthcoming 
there. This truth has been abundantly clear for decades. Why then was a policy that is wholly 
dependent on a variable that had little or no chance of ever happening pursued?  A starting point 
for United States policy should not have begun with the premise that GOS was (and is) working 
for the good of all its citizens. However, the fact that the United States has pursued a policy that 
ultimately depends on that very good will of GOS does not reflect a lack of political acumen or a 
misguided belief that Khartoum’s hegemonic policies can be reversed by direction U.S. policy 
took.  Assuming the latter would suggest a level of ineptness in U.S. policy that is frankly 
unfathomable.  Additionally, the U.S. record over the last two decades has not been consistent 
with this position. Time and again, the United States has lacked not insight, but the political will, 
to do more in Sudan to make tangible changes in Sudan. 
 However, it would be difficult to declare that U.S. policy has been an abject failure. 
What is often sidestepped by policy makers, scholars, and historians instead is that the United 
States has not done more because American policy has chosen to emphasize other ventures at the 
expense of Sudan. The U.S. has historically shown disinclination toward other than humanitarian 
endeavors in that region. Even these endeavors, (illuminated in Chapter Four) have been suspect 
in that they may be ultimately prolonging the crisis. In short, despite the rhetoric and many 
compassionate and learned voices, few U.S. policy makers truly believed that policy would lead 
to an end of conflict or humanitarian crisis in the Sudan.     
 The lack of American resolve to approach African nations with seriousness and due 
attention has historical roots. Even as Africa became relevant during the Cold War, it always 
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existed on the periphery. The copious amounts of cash that flowed from the United States to 
Africa during the Cold War to prop-up embattled regimes reflected the lack of urgency the 
United States felt for the African Continent.  Many of these ventures fostered internal strife and 
conflict. The indifference shown during Cold War diplomacy is perhaps analogous today to the 
money that flows into Africa via humanitarian endeavors to substitute for real diplomatic 
resources and attention.  
The catastrophic events of September 11, 2001, took place within this context. However, 
while 9-11 changed the nature of America’s relationships abroad significantly, it did not improve 
the situation in Sudan in terms of its crisis.  The United States continued its rhetoric, condemning 
the character of the NCP while simply issuing more sanctions. However, behind the tough 
language and the sanctions, which have never had a commensurate effect on NCP behavior, was 
the increased desire since 9-11 of the Bush administration to view Khartoum as a necessary 
partner in its declared “War on Terror.”  
For Bashir, a few factors that benefited him made cooperation with the United States 
after 9-11 possible. First, the NCP had already altered its ties to radical Islam and terrorist 
elements during the Clinton era. Also, the more recent break with Turabi naturally alienated 
many Islamists from the Bashir government. Additionally, it would not take the savviest 
politician to realize that while the United States might not want to devote its military might and 
full diplomatic resources to stopping the conflict in Sudan, it could act with its full might against 
any nation that was clearly linked to international terrorism.  The NCP, in the immediate wake of 
9-11, like other Islamic regimes around the world, feared the United States might act “Like a 
Wounded Bear.”131  Clearly the Bush Administration in regard to terrorism would not act with 
kid gloves. The NCP had to sense this.  Consequently then, Bashir was more than willing to 
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adhere to Washington’s wishes on this score, as the NCP’s focus continued to maintain its seat of 
power in Khartoum, first by subduing  Darfur.  
On the flip side, the Bush administration was more than prepared to accept Bashir’s lip 
service with regard to the CPA—this was a well-traveled path. Additionally, America’s main 
goal overwhelmingly after 9-11 was to defeat international terrorism. Cooperation from Sudan, a 
country once home to bin Laden, was thus necessary.  As the United States had never put much 
emphasis on foreign diplomacy in terms of this conflict, not much was altered or risked. The 
United States continued denouncing the NCP, and the NCP did enough to at least give the 
appearance of support for the CPA.  The irony of these circumstances was that regardless of the 
rhetoric, Washington and Khartoum had found common ground to proceed with their chief 
individual and self-serving goals.  
Although the CIA-NCP relationship remains shrouded, Jennifer Alexandra Newman, 
author of “Failure to Protect: Explaining the Response of the United States to the Crisis in 
Darfur,” claims the connection is a close one and has included cooperation on several fronts.  At 
the forefront is Salah Abdullah Gosh, the Sudanese intelligence chief, former bin Laden 
associate, and alleged architect of NCP’s strategy to arm the Janjaweed.   Gosh has been flown 
stateside for briefings via a CIA private jet, and Newman claims further that Gosh has been 
“instrumental in detaining terrorist suspects for U.S. interrogation, deporting Islamic extremists 
from Sudan, and raiding their homes to obtain evidence for the CIA.”132  
While the full extent of this association cannot be known, clearly there was a strong 
impetus under the Bush administration to subordinate all foreign policy matters to anti-terrorism 
aims and national security issues.  Once more, Jane Mayer’s The Dark Side chronicles the 
manner in which the Administration, overseen by Bush, but more directly led by Dick Cheney 
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and his legal team, headed by then Justice Department Lawyer, David Addington, crafted a 
foreign policy almost exclusively based around the anti-terrorism front.  However, considering 
the historic apathy toward Sudan and Africa as a whole, America’s position with regard to the 
Sudan conflict was not a radical departure, but certainly a detour.  That path would remain one 
that acted in “support” of the CPA, as condemnations and ineffectual sanctions continued.  
Thus, even as it was ratcheting up new sanctions and more acrimonious threats, 
Washington was establishing a more fixed relationship with Khartoum. While Khartoum had 
dealt with American rhetoric and sanctions for more than ten years, even structuring its most 
important asset –oil, around these, the newest turn in policy must have made Washington’s main 
objective truly transparent. Admonishments and toothless sanctions were no reason for Bashir to 
change his policy, but at least prior to 9-11, Bashir might have guessed—however remotely—
that the United States could perhaps take stronger action; his cooperation with the “War on 
Terror,” coupled with the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, however, almost guaranteed Bashir 
immunity from American intervention as least for the duration of that particular foreign policy.  
 Nonetheless, the United States, not wanting to appear as if it were doing nothing, 
continued to push sanctions and at least publicly denounce the NCP.  In September, 2006, 
President Bush issued Executive Order 13400, which blocked the assets of individuals connected 
to genocide in Darfur. In October, that order was followed by the Darfur Peace and 
Accountability Act (DPAA) and Executive Order 13412, which prohibited all transactions 
related to Sudan’s oil.  While these acts alone could not compel compliance, the Bush camp a 
month later warned of a more ominous “Plan B” if the NCP did not become more pliant. In 2007, 
Bush during a speech at the Holocaust Museum revealed that his “Plan B” would tighten 
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sanctions and extend them to 29 more companies. Jennifer Alexandria Newman correctly 
surmises that these sanctions, while powerful on paper, have had little effect on Khartoum.    
While actual American intervention in Sudan has never been likely, the area where U.S. 
policy has been mostly established is refugee and humanitarian initiatives. The evidence clearly 
illuminates the lack of resolve by the United States to end the war in Sudan through more 
forceful strategies. Again, while compassionate and informed voices do exist in Congress, few 
experts in the field believed the path of U.S. policy would lead to an end to the violence in 
Sudan. However, the paradigm shift toward humanitarian endeavors at the end of the Cold War 
cannot be separated from other initiatives or non-initiatives that America takes in Sudan.  The 
crisis in Sudan has created immeasurable suffering, much of it manifested in dispossession, 
hunger, and human rights abuses, all sadly endured by Sudan’s civilian population for decades.  
The West, including America, if absent the resolve to intervene more forcefully in the region, 
will be judged based on its humanitarian and refugee policies.  
From the preceding analysis, several general themes can be advanced. First, despite its 
ascendancy as a world power, and despite its relative free hand to aggressively pursue global 
initiatives post-Cold War, the United States has failed to act with resolve to stop the war in 
Sudan when it resumed in 1983.  Secondly, after more than a decade of reproaching Khartoum 
for its willful cruelty against its own citizens, Washington continued to support a peace process 
(CPA) that required the good faith of a regime already in power, the NCP. Third, despite the 
strong anti-Khartoum rhetoric and in spite of the Sudanese Government’s continued 
transgressions, the United States had not only continued its support of the CPA, but also 
developed a closer relationship with Khartoum. America’s primary concern post 9-11 has been 
international terrorism. Lastly, while America has fallen short of its stated goal to end the crisis 
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in Sudan, it is the limitations of its actions in the region devoted to the conflict and humanitarian 
crisis, (i.e. lack of delivering resources and solid diplomacy) that reflected America’s true aims.  
In short, the United States held to its traditional policy of keeping Sudan on the periphery of its 
foreign policy, while also diminishing its attention to the conflict and humanitarian crisis after 9-
11.   
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CHAPTER FOUR: AMERICA’S RESPONSE TO THE REFUGEE CRISIS IN SUDAN: 
THE FAILURE OF HUMANITARIANISM AND DECLINE OF AMERICAN ASYLUM 
While monumental changes swept the world geo-political landscape in the last several 
decades, from the Cold War to the abrupt end of global Communism and more recently in the 
aftermath of a post 9-11 world, American policy makers had consistently kept the conflict in 
Sudan on the margins of positive geopolitical action.  While many scholars and historians would 
be loath to call this approach a victory, the policy does—for better or worse—correspond to what 
American policy makers believed they could achieve in Sudan under the circumstances. 
Although American policy-makers, of course, wished for peace in Sudan, they were not 
committed to making the United States the catalyst for ending that conflict, nor did U.S. policy- 
makers, knowing all too well the leviathan task ending the crisis would be, believe the path 
would actually achieve real and lasting peace. However, this policy direction did allow 
Washington to devote its resources to other regions of the world that it considered more vital to 
its own geo-political interests.  For example, within the context of its Cold War commitments, 
the United States has devoted massive amounts of resources—militarily, financially, and in 
diplomacy—to the issue of Taiwan (or in the island’s defense), which the People’s Republic of 
China still claims as its own.  Of course similar expenditures and attention have been devoted to 
American commitments in other areas of Asia and in Europe, but not in Africa.  Post-Cold War 
and post 9-11, as America attempts to tackle international terrorism, the Middle East and Central 
Asia have received the bulk of America’s military, financial and diplomatic resources.     
Where then does the lack of attention to Africa leave American policy in Sudan? The 
United States had been most likely, aside from sanctions and rhetoric, to address the crisis in 
Sudan through humanitarian measures, via aid, as well as through its world refugee and asylum 
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policies. Humanitarian initiatives had become part and parcel of the foreign policy endeavors of 
the developed nations over the last two decades, especially in the Third World and most 
frequently in Africa. It is impossible to compartmentalize humanitarian and refugee programs, 
however.  Scholars argue that both are inherently politicized and tied to the agendas of the 
powerful nations that facilitate them. Often these policies are enacted at the expense of other 
more potent foreign policy initiatives. Further amplifying their political nature was the inability 
to separate the war in Sudan from the civilian population. Civilians, both as displaced persons 
and individuals requiring humanitarian aid, are no longer simply unfortunate bystanders, but 
instead fall within the perimeter of overriding war aims, as governments, proxy militias, and 
rebels seek, as their goals to displace and cause their perceived enemies to suffer. Lastly, even 
absent a larger political motivation that derives from  the powerful nations of the world, experts 
argue that both refugee and humanitarian programs, even when well-intended, can and do  have 
unintended consequences – many of them unfavorable.   
The conflict in Sudan led to a staggering humanitarian crisis.  Millions of Sudanese 
refugees, once driven from their homes, fled to neighboring countries seeking protection.  
Displaced persons generally have sixty times the death rate of their non-displaced brethren. 
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Millions of those who were displaced in Sudan

 lived within closed camps, fully dependent on 
humanitarian aid, with no foreseeable prospects of ever returning home.  Many who were able to 
return to their homes in Sudan found the situation there still dire. Additionally, Sudan currently 
has the dishonor of having one of the highest numbers of Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) in 
                                                 
 The Internal Displacement Monitoring Center estimated as of January 2011 that there were still 5 million 
internally displaced persons in Sudan.  The UNHCR uses a lower figure of 4.3 million. (both these figures include 
the region of southern Sudan that currently is the Republic of South Sudan)     
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the world.  Five million Sudanese, because of the conflict in Darfur and the Government of 
Sudan’s more than two decade long war against the South, are still suffering within their own 
country. 
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 Worse yet, those suffering within their own borders, (by not having crossed a border 
and while their antagonists are protected by state sovereignty) are often excluded from 
international protection afforded to refugees.  
The legal framework and verbiage associated with displaced persons originated and 
developed in the twentieth century following two catastrophic world wars.  The refugee crisis 
caused by the Second World War gave impetus to the current international system, which 
provides a link between state actors and the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees 
(UNHCR). The UNHCR’s historic mandate was codified in Geneva in 1951 and remains 
fundamental today in establishing the protection activities of that agency. The Mandate defines a 
refugee as: 
someone who, owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, 
religion, nationality, membership of a particular  social group or political opinion, is 
outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to 
avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality and being 
outside the country of his former habitual residence as a result of such events, is unable 
or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it. 
Louise W. Holborn in her seminal work

, Refugees: A Problem of Our Time. The Work of 
the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, 1951-1972, Volumes I and II, provides a 
                                                 
 Holborn is recognized as an authority on questions of refugees and refugee policy. Her comprehensive study of the 
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees during its first twenty two years, from 1951-1972, is encyclopedic 
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comprehensive view of the UNHCR’s role as protector of refugees and its role in assisting 
governments to help refugees repatriate or find asylum. Several concepts can be fleshed out from 
this work that are relevant to the current study.  For example, the UNHCR was saddled with a 
tremendously difficult task; while Holborn was able to demonstrate the agency’s remarkable 
performance, given the circumstances, maintaining great flexibility and integrity, Holborn also 
points out the limitations of the UN mandate.  
Revealing its uniquely Western origins, the refugee mandate was set up initially after 
World War II for three years (it has since been renewed every five years) and was targeted to 
assist refugees displaced prior to 1951 as a result of the war in Europe. While the definition of 
refugee was universal, the Western nations were leery of offering a blank check for future 
events.  A 1967 protocol eventually removed the temporal and geographical limitations of the 
1951 mandate. However, the mandate remained a creation of the period, crafted with the 
hindsight of World War II, and the foresight of recognizing the oncoming Cold War.  
Holborn reveals that the UNHCR’s role (much like any UN affiliate) is promotional, 
meaning the High Commissioner must appeal to governments and private sources for its revenue.  
The extremely political nature of refugees ensures that state actors did not want to cede complete 
independence of action to the UNHCR. Nor, given its lack of size and budget, could the UNHCR 
dictate policy. So while the devastation of World War II prompted world leaders to envision the 
UNHCR as an agency that could help transition Europe back to normalcy, UNHCR leaders also 
realized that its policy could be trumped or dictated by the level of funding. Correspondingly, 
financial backing or the denial of it could, and often did, determine the direction of policy that 
                                                                                                                                                             
in scope and provides a detailed, country by country account of refugee crisis and the UN’s response. Holborn 
established the orthodoxy in the field by commenting on the political nature of the UN mandate as well.     
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the UNHCR took.  While the United States has been a generous sponsor of the UN, what 
endeavors it has chosen to support have been vital and certainly key in determining the 
UNHCR’s future policy. 
Also by revealing its origins and political concerns the creators of the mandate, reflecting 
back on Nazi aggression and Soviet encroachment, determined that protection of a nation’s 
sovereignty had to be an essential part of any mandate. The creators of the mandate did not want 
the mandate to be a fait accompli for the next act of aggression. Additionally, concerns of weaker 
nations, which felt the convention would simply be another excuse for European intrusion, could 
not simply be ignored.  With these fears in mind, the notion of inviolable sovereignty and non-
interference were imbedded into the mandate. Thus, central to its definition, an individual must 
have crossed an international border to acquire refugee status. Consequently protections offered 
by the mandate are more reactive and triggered when a person crosses an international border. 
The obvious ramifications are discussed at more length later in the paper for Sudan and Africa 
which, beset by internal conflicts, becomes the question of protection (or lack of protection) for 
internally displaced persons (IDPs).   
Additionally, while a refugee has the right to seek asylum, a state is not required to act as 
a host under the mandate, nor does the mandate call for the manner in which the task of asylum 
must be divided. The latter stipulation, or lack of quota, grants the United States the flexibility to 
open itself up to the world’s dispossessed. However, while it is convenient to view the latter 
flexibility as a boon or opportunity for the more prosperous nations of the world (who in theory 
can incorporate more refugees), the lack of clarity and the politicized nature of asylum has led to 
contention and confusion with regard to each nation’s ultimate responsibility. For example, 
Jeffrey Crisp, author of Humanitarianism Assistance and the Development Process explains that 
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Western nations (donor states) have more and more believed that aid should be spent on the 
integration of refugees into the initial host state. In the case of Sudanese refugees this obviously 
would mean that Sudan’s neighbors would bear more of the burden.  
On the other hand, these host African states believe that the Western nations should 
accept more of the responsibility by either accepting more asylum cases or helping to repatriate 
refugees to their homeland. In the last decade, and especially since 9-11, the United States has 
aided with this last endeavor, focusing on returning many Sudanese to their homes. The 
aforementioned policy, critics argue, is tantamount to refoulement, a principle of the 1951 
convention that states that no refugee should be returned to a country where there would be a risk 
of persecution.  American support of returning refugees to Sudan, while considered part of the 
peace process, is a questionable practice at best, as it has coincided with continued violence in 
Sudan plus a dwindling number of African asylum cases (post 9-11) accepted by the United 
States.  Ongoing violence in Sudan and President Bashir’s recent position in the summer of 2011 
that he will continue to starve out resistance in the Juba Mountains is especially troubling. 
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With these factors in mind, the displacement crisis that emerged in Africa after World 
War II, albeit still evolving, was much different than those with which the UNHCR was created 
to deal.  Holborn, writing in 1975, points out that the majority of Africans displaced in the 
previous decade were rural and either subsistence farmers or herdsmen and displaced as a result 
of internal conflicts, often crossing artificial borders to seek refuge with their kinsmen. In 
contrast, Europe’s population crossed international borders (vital to acquire refugee status), and 
more likely than not moved from one urban setting to another urban setting.
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  These individuals 
would need less assistance in making the transition into an already familiar urban setting. 
However, Africa’s population flows were often continuous, often tied to religious, ethnic and 
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economic issues within their home states, and by the 1970s increasingly rural to urban 
migrations. Consequently aid to assist in development and integration was necessary, more 
complex, and needed to be fluid. 
Also, it should be noted that the Sudanese policy toward refugees during this period, as 
well as Africa in general, has been applauded by several prominent historians. So, while African 
states like Sudan had a lack of experience with international law that was geared toward Europe, 
historically speaking, Sudan was considered a hospitable environment in an immediate post-
independent Africa.   Louise W. Holborn, Gaim Kibreab, and John Rogge, respectively 
concurred, and John Rogge, author of Too Many, Too Long: Sudan’s Twenty-Year Refugee 
Dilemma, adds that Sudan’s refugee policy had to deal with a diverse set of circumstances and 
incorporated assistance, rehabilitation, and development, and could be “employed elsewhere.”137   
However, these viewpoints should be taken with a bit of a caveat. Holborn wrote before 
the resumption of Sudan’s civil war in 1983, while Rogge’s book was published in 1985, and 
referred more to refugees from neighboring states who were seeking asylum in Sudan, not 
Internally Displaced Persons (IDP’s) from Sudan’s civil war. Furthermore, Kibreab uses Sudan’s 
previous amiable policy to contrast with the policy of the NIF/NCP in the late 1980s and early 
1990s, which he considered a more unfriendly pattern of forced camps, as well as refugee 
expulsions from urban areas—now a growing trend in Africa and Sudan. America’s response to 
the crisis in Sudan can only be viewed effectively by keeping this evolving policy in mind.    
The logistical problems associated with accommodating new waves of migrants who fled 
(or were driven away by the government and its proxy fighters) after the resumption of war in 
the South were now coupled with “subversive elements” that the Sudanese government feared 
must be among the dispossessed. The intractable war, coupled with drought throughout the Horn 
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of Africa led to mass movements of refugees (and IDPs) both in and out of Sudan in the 1980s. 
GOS had struck in strategic areas, a region considered the most valuable for rich deposits of oil.  
Among these was the Bor District, which was estimated to have lost 90,000 Dinka, as well the 
city of Bentiu, which lost 160,000 Sudanese by 1985. While the majority of the dispossessed 
were Southerners fleeing government forces, Cohen and Deng suggest that the SPLA uprooted at 
least 50,000 people.
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The areas most affected by the end of the decade were the Red Sea Province, Kassala 
Province, and the Southern region. While some southerners were able to take sanctuary in 
strongholds, such as Juba within Sudan’s southern borders, the majority simply fled to 
communist Ethiopia, which housed numerous camps. By the end of the 1980s, the refugee 
numbers had swelled in these camps to 300,000.
139
 However, this relative sanctuary also proved 
to be short lived.  The once friendly Ethiopian Communist regime, now struggling amidst famine 
and despotic rule, was overthrown in 1991, resulting in a military- led campaign to drive 
refugees out of Ethiopia. The majority fled to Kenya and back into Sudan.   
The exodus from Ethiopia, coupled with the increased ferocity of fighting in Sudan after 
the NIF (NCP) coup in 1989, led to a huge increase of IDPs in Sudan. By the 1990’s, there were 
as many as two million displaced persons in and around Khartoum.
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 Many of these urban 
settlers were denied access to jobs and basic services.   While these urban refugees/IDPs 
represented only a fraction of the dispossessed in Sudan (many more were interred in camps) 
their condition did reflect the evolving nature of GOS’s policies. 
The policies that now had evolved to abject neglect would become by the 1990’s (with 
the NIF/NCP now in power) increasingly more hostile, including the setting up of fixed camps 
and expulsion from urban areas.  Policy initiatives by the NIF/NCP included: Manipulating water 
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and food, denying it to the male population, not allowing wells to be dug,
141
 and bulldozing the 
makeshift homes of 500,000 displaced persons in and around Khartoum.
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 The Sudan Times, the 
only newspaper that supported the refugees’ cause, exposed these excesses of the Sudanese 
government:  
[T]the police under the authority of the commissioner of Khartoum have unleashed a 
campaign that flies in the face of human rights, confuses forced submission with public 
good order and comes close to making a mockery of Sudan’s otherwise admirable record 
with respect to refugees.”143  
The troubling nature of the growing humanitarian crisis that accompanied these new 
policies was that international law and practice seemed to be stacked against gaining any 
Western intervention. National sovereignty in the Cold War period was a matter of necessity. 
Additionally, the NIF’s policies toward its displaced persons much like its war record (both 
inexorably intertwined) was a matter of continuing its declared policy of dominating Sudan. The 
United States and the international community were still having to deal with a government that 
not only did not have the best interests of the majority of its people at heart, but also routinely 
made the civilian population a target as part of its own war aims. 
Indeed, by 1990, there were 1.8 million Sudanese displaced within the conflict zone.
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Additionally, by the 1990’s,  the displaced persons in Sudan (as well as internationally) were 
increasingly more likely to be IDPs who were placed, regardless of geographic, cultural or 
occupational backgrounds, in restricted camps that were not self- sufficient and were largely 
dependent on aid for survival .  These circumstances, while in part motivated by local events in 
Sudan, could also be attributable to the geopolitical forces that swept the globe post- Cold War. 
This trend has continued unabated into the twenty- first century.  
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Displacement post-Cold War continued to diverge from the previous patterns, creating 
both more obstacles and greater opportunities for the United States.  With the end of the Cold 
War tension came a relaxing grip by the super powers and in distant and marginally relevant 
places like Africa, the  predominant causes of displacement soon became race, language, culture, 
or religion.  Most became displaced due to inter-state conflicts, in nations where arbitrary rule 
and despotism were the order of the day; these nations, including Sudan, saw an uneven 
disbursement of power, so dispossession was not necessarily an unfortunate by-product of war, 
but rather an aim in and of itself. This tendency is reflected in the displaced numbers: in 1982 
there were 1.2 million IDP’s in 11 African countries, but by 1997 there were 20 million in 35 
countries!
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Sudan’s IDP crisis and its reaction to its own displaced persons cannot be taken out of the 
context of global events during this period. While it would be easy to simply castigate the 
Sudanese government, its response to the displacement crisis in key areas mirrors the 
international trend that was also taking place. To begin with, the 1970s and 1980s witnessed 
globally (and in Sudan) a move toward aid- driven responses. These endeavors, although of a 
humanitarian nature, were more inclined to include long-term planning— a characteristic sorely 
lacking in the current humanitarian ventures.  Jeffrey Crisp notes that these initiatives at the 
outset were geared toward development or durable solutions for displaced persons. While camps 
did exist, they were not isolated and dependency was avoided by creating fluid interaction with 
the local people and the local environment, thus creating a community that tended to be self –
sufficient. These individuals often relied on wage earning and agricultural schemes.  However, 
despite such local successes, on an international level the move toward development and durable 
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solutions still failed due to the lack of durable solutions addressing the factors that were causing 
the displacement.  
Mostly to blame were those past issues of the UNHCR mandate that only relied on state 
actors for cooperation and funding. The opposing wills or needs of the Western nations versus 
those of the host African states often created contradictory or ambiguous goals. The host African 
nations were reluctant to develop areas or aid programs for refugees whom they felt should only 
be housed temporarily—if the Western nations would not help by accepting a larger percentage 
of asylum cases, then repatriation was the only solution. Additionally, the vast numbers of IDPs 
would require more thorough development, which would require peacekeepers in Sudan, an even 
more politically charged situation and lessening the likelihood that the Western nations would 
get involved at all. The result was that the United States and other Western nations chose the 
path of least resistance, namely, food aid and repatriation. Considering that both were extremely 
limited in terms of offering long-term solutions, fixed, dependent camps became the order of the 
day.     
 The High Commissioner (HC) during the pivotal decade of the 1990’s, Sadako Ogata, 
was instrumental in fostering what she described as a move away from a “rigid Cold War 
structure” toward a more holistic global approach that took into account both sovereignty issues 
and the political and military objectives of the intervening states.
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 Ogata confirmed the real 
political and financial challenges, stating that “wealthy countries with the transformation of 
world politics won’t act fully, but feel compelled to do something of humanitarian concerns.”147  
Ogata, given the political nature of the UNHCR’s mandate and its dependence on the purse and 
the will of state actors, called this move a “compromise,” but a necessary one.148 The 
“compromise” approach advocated by the former HC, coincided with (and then advanced) the 
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growing move toward humanitarianism. However, while Ogata was prescient in terms of 
understanding Western motivation, she misjudged both the desire of the Western nations and the 
ability of UNHCR to steer the growing humanitarian response toward anything resembling a 
durable solution.  
Obscuring the situation that refugee numbers were lower in the 1990s were the 25 
million
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 IDPs at the end of the millennium, who despite the legal niceties, lived in situations 
that were comparable or worse than those for the refugees. Rather than invest in humanitarian 
endeavors that would prove long lasting by developing strategies to integrate displaced persons 
or make them self -sufficient, Western donor and host African states essentially reduced their 
humanitarianism to that of ad-hoc or stop gap measures. By the end of Ogata’s tenure, an 
estimated 6.2 million people worldwide were languishing in camps now considered to be 
“protracted” situations.150   
While part of the UNHCR’s original mandate was to provide durable solutions, the 
United States, mirroring the international trend, also steered a course toward aid (i.e. food and 
immediate supplies) as opposed to the development of a long- term solution. Among the 
developed countries, relative to budgeting, the United States ranked 20
th
 in development 
spending in 1993. While funding for humanitarian relief did increase—up from $297 million in 
1989, to $1.2 billion in 1993—much of that actual increase during this period was for food aid, 
while funds designated for development actually declined.
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 Further, scholars began to question 
the apparent bias that accompanies dispersal of aid. There has been an alarming trend of under-
funding of African- based humanitarian programs; the dearth of aid is sometimes linked with 
questions of race or more innocuously seen as “donor fatigue.”  Thomas G. Weiss and Cindy 
Collins, authors of Humanitarian Challenges and Intervention, point out that UNHCR received 
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90% of its funds in mid -October 1999 for 800,000 Kosovo refugees, while only receiving a 
fraction of this amount for 6, 000,000  Africans.
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The American public, often ignorant of such nuances in types of aid or the political 
motivations behind it, is often inundated by media images portraying the dispossessed as victims 
in need of “rescuing.”  In the 1990s, stories of Sudan’s “Lost Boys” were ubiquitous. While the 
precise impact of the media can of course be debated, these accounts, as well as the perceived 
humanitarian nature of American’s foreign policy, unquestionably became politically expedient, 
as it allowed the U.S. government to appease a public that was demanding that something be 
done.  In fact, both the media and the government in recent foreign interventions have 
consistently downplayed military and political objectives, instead choosing to describe such 
ventures in humanitarian verbiage.  
Both Gulf Wars, even with their obvious economic and political ramifications, were 
consistently linked to stories that humanized the events. The general public most often was 
flooded with descriptions of a menacing Saddam Hussein whose victims ranged from the Iraqi 
soccer team to Iraq’s Kurdish population. Even the Somalia intervention, routinely and matter of 
factly was described as a humanitarian undertaking, has more recently come under fire. Cecil 
Dubernet persuasively describes the impetus for intervention as being politically motivated. The 
tendency then by American policy makers and media to describe intervention in these terms 
often gives the public an inflated and inaccurate sense of U.S. foreign policy being solely 
motivated by humanitarian concerns.  
In fact, a recent poll indicated that Americans believe the United States contributes much 
more to humanitarian ventures than it actually does:  Those polled believed 15% of the U.S. 
budget went to foreign aid, while in actuality, the number is 1%. The poll also showed that 
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Americans believed 40% of UN peacekeepers were American, but in reality that number is 
5%.
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 However, while the general public tends to get its information through the sporadic and 
narrow lens of the popular media, U.S. policy makers, much like their awareness of the CPA’s 
shortcomings, realized the humanitarian path was lacking.  
The direction that the international and U.S. policy had taken, choosing to focus on 
repatriation and aid, rather than asylum or a long-term solution was a clear step away from the 
spirit or the 1951 mandate, which was to provide protection to refugee and to seek durable 
solutions.   That move brought into question the effectiveness of the new strategies as well as the 
principles and motivations of the state actors.  At best, scholars have viewed humanitarianism as 
inherently political, but at worst, critics argue vehemently that such a move does more harm than 
good and even prolongs conflict and suffering. While the negatives associated with the delivered 
humanitarian polices are too extensive to enumerate here, a brief look at those arguments raises 
serious doubts about America’s foreign policy direction in Sudan.  
First and foremost, humanitarianism instead of working in conjunction with true 
diplomacy has replaced it, often becoming synonymous with inaction. W.R. Smyser, author of 
The Humanitarian Conscience: Caring for Others in the Age of Terror, comments that 
“humanitarian aid has expanded worldwide”, while the West is “less inclined to spend money 
and true effort” to address the underlying causes of displacement.154  A 2007 Congressional 
report also noted that “too often in Africa humanitarian assistance, as limited and under-funded 
as it may be, becomes the primary means for powerful countries to engage with African 
problems.” The report adds further, “The United States needs to engage fully with Africa in 
partnership with its allies and the United Nations, committing serious diplomatic resources, not 
just humanitarian funding, to bring a halt to conflicts and their attendant human rights abuses.”155 
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Much like the expedient CPA, American humanitarian dollars built political currency, but 
created little substantive change in Sudan.  
Furthermore, humanitarian actors must be viewed in the end, whether NGOs or UN 
officials, as political actors. David Kennedy, author of The Dark Sides of Virtue claims 
humanitarians, who are  full of slogans such as “we’re here to make things better,” are 
responsible for a reckless pride and sense of superiority that often leads to little more than 
promoting Western interests at the expense of the population they claim to be aiding.
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  In a 
striking example of Western hubris, American “humanitarian” interventions often are a detriment 
to the very populations they claimed to be assisting. For example, aid in Somalia had the effect 
of driving market prices up and encouraged overcrowding and looting in Mogadishu. The 
majority of displaced persons—those that most needed the aid— had either already fled to Kenya 
or could no longer afford food after the price fluctuations.
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 Additionally, the various accounts 
that surfaced of the “Lost Boys’ paint young Sudanese as victims, both backward and helpless, 
until they were rescued and brought to America to work and flourish in a civilized society. The 
insistence of painting Southern Sudanese in this manner perpetuates an outlook that certainly 
cannot help garner the South the diplomatic attention it so sorely has lacked from the United 
States and other nations.   
Another troubling aspect of humanitarian aid is that without any associated long-term 
development, dependent, static camps are created.  As well as fostering dependence, these camps 
can lead to environmental degradation or at least foster that belief within the community, which 
then leads to tensions and conflict with the local populations. 
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 Displaced persons within closed 
camps are also much more likely to be victims of violence. A 2005 UN Human Rights 
Commission on Sexual Violence in Sudan documented weekly cases of rape and sexual violence 
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against women, as well as reports of extortion, robbery, and violent crimes against a wide 
demographic.  In a number of cases, the alleged perpetrators are actually members of the armed 
forces or the police.
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Additionally, aid dispersal, especially in times of drought which is common in Sudan, led 
to local inhabitants becoming envious or even perpetuating conflict to gain access to aid. It has 
been commonly noted too that both Khartoum and various rebel factions manipulated both the 
aid and the camps.  Operation Lifeline Sudan (OLS) in 1989 and OLS II the following year both 
fell prey to manipulation, as have recent efforts in Darfur. Camp militarization, an alarming trend 
in Sudan, is often exacerbated by international aid as IDPs are “manipulated as instruments of 
war.”160 The troubling nature of camp dependence has even led some scholars, most notably 
African specialist Alex de Waal, to contend that humanitarian aid since it perpetuates conflict in 
Sudan should cease, allowing the population to reach a point of “sufficient desperation” where it 
might rise up to oppose the egregious rule of the NCP.
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 De- Waal’s theory, if it can be taken at 
face value, is very unlikely to become palatable to the American public or Congress (or 
hopefully anyone else, particularly the UN); however, it does speak to the very real concerns, 
many of them unsavory, which are associated with the U.S. path in Sudan.  
In fact, scholars have taken the previous orthodox “political” nature of the humanitarian 
argument even further, drawing even more unwelcome attention to American policy. Recent 
evidence has shown that static camps are not just an unwelcome by-product, absent the resolve to 
implement long- term durable solutions, but may even be an intended course set by America and 
other Western nations which fear the political and economic ramifications of massed border 
crossings. While substantial effort has been made to describe American foreign policy initiatives 
in humanitarian terms, often “protection” of the dispossessed (the majority of IDPs) is 
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tantamount to keeping these individuals contained. Certainly the most obvious example was the 
first Gulf War.  When Iraqi bombardments threatened Kurds and Shi’ite Muslims in Northern 
Iraq, the UN Security Council approved intervention and on 16 April 1991, President George 
Bush Sr. announced to the world:   
Consistent with United Nations Security Council’s Resolution 688, and working closely 
with the United Nations and other International relief organizations and our European 
partners, I have directed the U.S. military to begin immediately to establish several 
encampments in northern Iraq, where relief supplies for these refugees will be made 
available…and distributed in an orderly way. 162  
President Bush’s incorrect usage of the term “refugee” while appearing trivial at first, 
ironically points to the fact that the exodus of Iraqis was prevented from crossing an international 
border (on the insistence of the United States and Turkey), thus denying these individuals the 
inherent protections that come with refugee status. The episode was described in “terms of 
efficiency,” emphasizing the “suffering” of those displaced, and the “care” they were given due 
to the American actions.
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  American policy, by restricting those in danger from fleeing or 
receiving asylum, was in complete contradiction to the spirit of the UN mandate. Many who 
could have perhaps received asylum languished in camps and were subjected to a quasi- prison 
environment. An estimated thirty to sixty percent of the displaced Iraqi Kurdish population 
refused to return to their place of origin, but aid was then used to forestall their movement 
toward Turkey’s border.164  Similar arrangements were also enacted in the Balkans in the name 
of humanitarianism where “protection” was meant only to keep the population stabilized.   
While these situations differ greatly from Sudan’s predicament, there are several 
conclusions that can be drawn from a comparison.  The commonality has been a consistent 
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subordination of the true spirit of the UN mandate in favor of responses that the U.S. believes 
will favor its own geo-political position. Policy-makers cannot be unduly criticized for following 
a policy which they feel is in their best interest—all nations do that. However, to understand the 
U.S. position more fully, its rhetoric and notions of its historic role as a bastion of the 
dispossessed needs to be tempered and understood in its proper political context.  Presently in 
Sudan there are still a huge number of IDPs and many of these individuals live in appalling and 
dangerous conditions.  American policy, especially after 9-11, was to both push for repatriation, 
and decrease its number of asylum grants; considering many of the persons repatriated to Sudan 
continued to suffer, what motivated the United States to pursue this path? 
In recent memory, the U.S. has enthusiastically embraced the UN mandate: For example, 
during the Cold War years, the United States passed the Refugee Relief Act, setting aside more 
restrictive immigration laws and truly opening up its borders. However, the former was done in 
conjunction with America’s core geo-political concerns, as the majority of immigrants were 
coming from Communist countries or the Middle East. However,  Neither Sudan’s intractable 
conflict, which killed millions, nor its horrific humanitarian and displacement crises, have 
garnered Sudan or East Africa the same attention as other areas of the world .  In addition, 
presently, the chief concern in the region, namely terrorism, further subordinates and lessons the 
likelihood that the United States will honor the spirit of the UN mandate which was to grant 
displaced persons asylum and durable solutions to their plight.  
So, while the Balkans and Iraq were costly interventions both politically and monetarily, 
these risks were considered commensurate with the value that the United States places both on 
the region itself and its subsequent stability. The goal in these strategic areas was no more to 
honor the UN mandate than it was in Sudan, but the general indifference toward Sudan (and the 
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region) precluded the United States from investing the same material resources there. The threat 
of international terrorism only amplified the historic U.S. apathy toward the Sudanese conflict 
and its displacement crisis. Consequently, while the United States did not intervene forcibly to 
protect the integrity of East African borders, it did alter its humanitarian and refugee policies to 
accommodate the growing concerns for international terrorism.  
Despite the fact that the peace process, along with American dollars, given namely for 
humanitarian initiatives, gave the guise of moral credibility to U.S. policy, decisions made post 
9-11 continued to reflect a policy in which the Sudanese crisis, if it did matter, remained very far 
on the periphery.  Although, many compassionate voices still issued a clarion call in Congress, 
lamenting the loss of life in Sudan and the lack of will on GOS’s part to pursue real peace, the 
chief concern for the United States as it related to Sudan and the world was the threat of 
terrorism. 
The United States has tied its policy halfheartedly to an ephemeral peace initiative in 
Sudan, whereas America’s “War on Terror” has received the full backing of the United States, 
materially, militarily, and monetarily. Just in terms of budget requirements on the wars in Iraq 
and Afghanistan, the U.S. has spent, since the inception of these wars up until May 2009, almost 
$900 billion.
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  These figures do not include any other expenditures associated with counter-
terrorism initiatives. 
At the same time, the areas where the United States could help, namely, humanitarian 
initiatives, and monetary funds, especially for asylum cases, shamefully continued to lessen.  The 
U.S. Patriot Act of 2001 and the Real ID Act of 2005, while meshed with the interests of 
American policy, caused an already scant number of refugee admissions to ebb still further. 
These policies, enacted in response to the horrific attacks of 9-11, changed visa limits for 
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temporary workers and tightened laws on application for asylum and deportation of aliens. 
Several provisions under these acts—to be addressed later— appear to reflect an indifference to 
those in need, and a stubborn insistence to making the peace process work despite the realities on 
the ground and the needs of those displaced.   
In effect, pushing the failed CPA forward melded with and supported several U.S. policy 
initiatives in Sudan. As long as Bashir continued to halfheartedly support the CPA, thus “ending” 
the civil war, the U.S. could in “good conscience” go forward with its own geo-political 
objectives. First, it achieved cooperation with the NCP in America’s counter- terrorism efforts. 
Secondly, it buttressed American apathy with regard to the humanitarian crisis in the region. 
Since in theory the CPA had ended the war, the United States could both push for Sudanese 
refugees to be repatriated, thus denying funding for long- term solutions, and limit requests for 
asylum. These aims, while reflecting a real fear of terrorist threats, also provided a convenient 
juxtaposition to the historic apathy of the region; the United States could try and keep its own 
borders impenetrable from terrorist threats and claim that Sudan was moving forward with the 
peace process as displaced persons were repatriated back to Sudan.  
Members of Congress have even indicated that U.S. policy puts “an exaggerated 
emphasis on repatriation rather than resettlement.”166 However, this policy of repatriation fell in 
line with the peace process, which provided a semblance of moral credibility, both for the United 
States and the Sudanese Government, which shamefully had promoted itself as an agent of 
change and peace in the region. Additionally, asylum cases settled in the U.S. provided 
incendiary rhetoric to political action groups who then took their case to Congress to further 
expose the transgressions of GOS. An embarrassment was unwanted by the NCP, and perhaps by 
the American government. Though these indictments were long trumpeted by several influential 
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members of Congress, policy dictated that if the United States did not believe Bashir’s promises, 
they at least had to give him the benefit of the doubt or look the other way to continue down the 
current path. The U.S. had committed too few resources to develop any real long- term 
integration plans for the displaced and placed too few personnel on the ground to enforce 
compliance to the peace process or guarantee safety to those who were repatriated.    
In order for the peace process to have any credibility at all, millions of Sudanese –at least 
in theory- would have to be welcomed home. The policy hardly took into account the realities on 
the ground, but either did the CPA without the full resources of the United States in support of it  
and a genuine change in GOS policies. What won out were U.S. interests and resources that were 
being devoted elsewhere, ultimately leading to a dogged insistence on moving forward with a 
paper agreement or peace process that ironically would have little tangible effect on the lives of 
those it so strongly professed it would help. 
Although resettling or offering asylum to IDP’s has always been a delicate issue, the 
Patriot Act and the Real ID Act have hurt even the numbers of asylum cases that do fall under 
the UN Mandate. In the awakening caused by the horrific acts of 9-11, the Patriot Act was 
passed by wide margins in Congress. Although, the length and breadth of the bill is extensive, as 
it relates to asylum, it increased the scrutiny on immigration to a hyper-vigilance now reflected 
in diminishing numbers. 
Although Congress did note that the number of “people of concern” or those that would 
benefit from asylum in Africa had risen to 19.2 million by 2005, the number of refugee 
admissions to the United States post 9-11 still continued to decline.  In the fiscal years 2002 and 
2003, U.S. asylum grants fell to historic lows of 27,100 and 28,422, less than half those for the 
fiscal year total for 2001 at 69,304.
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  Considering the immense number of people in need, 
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especially in wake of the increasingly contentious conflict in Darfur, that number seems 
increasingly paltry.  At a hearing for World Refugee Day, notables and members of Congress 
listed several key issues with regard to the number of African refugees’ moving forward. They 
were the U.S. Patriot Act, the Real ID Act, U.S. funding drying up, and a reliance on a 
humanitarian agenda as opposed to approaching Africa in real diplomatic terms.
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While the budget for Iraq and Afghanistan has been in the hundreds of billions, the 
targeted budget for overseas assistance to Africa in 2005 was $330 million. Not mitigating these 
paltry numbers is the fact that Sudan is just one of many African nations experiencing both 
internal conflict and a humanitarian crisis. Donald Payne of New Jersey, a member of Congress 
since 1988, and a long -time opponent of GOS’s policies, has voiced concern due to the lack of 
attention and funds reserved by the United States for Africa. As a member of the Committee of 
International Relations in 2006, Payne lamented the drying up of such funds, connecting the 
change to the diminished number of asylum cases from Africa. Despite the deteriorating situation 
in Sudan, President George W. Bush asked for only $236 million for 2007, a number, according 
to Payne, that was substantially lower than what would be needed to meet the ceiling set at 
70,000 refugees for that year.
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 In Payne’s opinion even the quota itself is distressingly low, and 
he added further that the U.S. refugee policy favors groups like Cubans at the expense of those in 
more dire situations.
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Likewise, the material support provision, originally an amendment to the Immigration 
and Nationality Act (INA) in 1996, was broadened after 9-11, further restricting the number of 
asylum cases admitted to the United States. Further, U.S. policy, which relies heavily on “group 
referrals,” has not invested the needed monetary or personnel resources, even if there was the 
impetus to do so, to evaluate referrals on a case- by- case basis. However, the real impediment 
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continues to be the broad brushstroke of the material provision. The original amendment 
stipulated the following:  
[E]extended immigration restrictions against members of terrorist organizations to more 
indirect affiliates of such groups. It defined, for the first time, the concept of “material 
support” as the provision of money, goods, personnel, and/or training to terrorist 
organizations. It also barred those who provided such assistance from entering the United 
States.  
The Patriot Act of 2001, the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, 
and the Real ID Act of 2005 significantly broadened the original definition to include the 
following:  
[M]material support to terrorism is defined as the provision of any property, tangible or 
intangible service, including currency or monetary instruments of financial securities 
services, lodging, training, expert advice or assistance, safe houses, false documentation 
or identification, communications equipment, facilities, weapons, lethal substances, 
explosives, personnel and transportation, except medicine or religious materials to 
terrorist organizations.     
Although, concerns were expressed in Congress in a variety of ways, the most common 
criticism was that “the law provides no exception for motivation, and thus the statutory definition 
could include groups that are engaged in opposition to repressive regimes.”171 More 
confounding, when viewed through a closer lens, it becomes quite apparent that the provision 
impacts individuals in Sudan who in every shape and form should fall within the perimeters of 
the United States asylum policy.   
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Anastasia Brown, Director of Refugee Programs, in a 2006 Congressional hearing before 
the House noted the ramifications of the Material Support Provision on potential asylum seekers. 
Declaring the intimate and often brutal nature of civil war in Africa where soldiers and civilians 
are not distinguished from one another, Brown added, “In [W[west Africa women and children 
who were raped and mutilated, whose families are killed in front of their eyes, who were held 
captive in their homes fall under the material support because they housed these criminals.”172 
The law is so broad, that it injures any individual (even if compelled for reasons of their own 
safety) who provide materials or sustenance -even a glass of water- to an organization involved 
in resistance against a despotic regime. Brown’s comments drew an obvious parallel to the 
situation in Sudan. The nature of the Civil War in Sudan and its intimate closeness to civilians 
thus excluded many Sudanese, forbidding any American protection, and thus victimizing them a 
second time. 
Additionally, the provision, when viewed from a broader perspective seems to inherently 
contradict the very fabric and historical foundation of the United States. The United States 
revolutionary past would seemingly lend sympathy to those oppressed by the cruel hegemony 
that Khartoum has imposed on the rest of that country. Congressman and Chairman of the 
Subcommittee on Africa, Christopher H. Smith, sardonically commented on the harm the 
Material Provision does to causes that America professes to heartily support: in a 2006 
Congressional hearing, in response to the material support law that broadly includes groups 
engaged in opposition to repressive regimes, he exclaimed, “Presumably, that could be the 
Northern Alliance. It could be Cubans who resisted Castro. In Southern Sudan, it could be those 
who defended themselves against the Khartoum Government as it committed genocide there or, 
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conversely, those who in the north, in Darfur, resisting the Janjaweed. George Washington could 
have fallen into that category 200 years ago!”173  
However, while Smith represents a compassionate voice and argues ardently for a 
common sense approach to asylum, what he fails to state plainly is that the Material Provision, 
instead of being contrary to U.S. policy in Sudan, actually complements it. The United States has 
continued to be invested in the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA), a paper agreement that 
allowed policy makers to expend as few resources as possible while claiming it did its part. 
Rhetoric aside, the American government—much like every other government—acts in 
accordance with what it believes its own self- interests to be.   
 Congressional records do show, perhaps overwhelmingly so, that much like Smith, there 
are sympathetic individuals in the American government. The element that is lacking is not 
compassion, but rather the actual will to do more in Sudan to produce a tangible change. For 
American policy- makers the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) may have left open a 
sense of a diminished moral responsibility, but the agreement has done little to mitigate the 
suffering for those who languish in camps or return to their homes where their situation remains 
still very dire. Even while American policy- makers have listened and lamented over the 
humanitarian tragedy in Sudan, much of which falls at the feet of the government there, they 
have steered a path away from the honorable humanitarian principles embedded in the 1951 
mandate. Worse yet, the United States by sponsoring a peace that included the NCP, has 
essentially codified that regime’s legitimacy, thus pinning the future hopes of the nation (and on 
South Sudan) on the inconceivable belief  that this regime will honor its commitments. That is 
not likely, nor have there as yet been any indications suggesting such an acceptance. 
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CHAPTER FIVE: AFTERWORD 
Given the continued intransigence of the Sudanese government can there be any cause for 
optimism that the crisis and humanitarian disaster in Sudan will eventually end? Several factors 
in the coming years could play a significant role in that effort.   First and foremost, although its 
power and prestige have certainly flagged in the last decade, the United States still wields 
tremendous influence in the world. While the shift by the developed nations toward 
humanitarianism has often meant an absence of true diplomacy and resolve, thus offering few 
tangible changes in Sudan, this trend has coincided with developments that could offer future 
opportunities for more aggressive moves in Sudan. The notion that sovereignty is not sacred has 
found expression in many forms, most notably in the UN’s R2P, as well as in the Bush 
Doctrine’s philosophy of preventative war.  Could the crisis in Sudan be altered by outside 
Western intervention under these newer determining factors?  As previously stated in this thesis 
a precedent already exists for the United States to intervene more aggressively in sovereign 
nations. However, despite the precedent and the NCP’s continued oppressive actions against its 
own citizens, the United States, lacking the will, is not likely to act against the NCP. However, 
while Darfur and South Kordafan (particularly the Nuba Mountains) are still part of Sudan and 
continue to suffer under Khartoum’s hegemonic rule, the South, which became the independent 
nation of the Republic of South Sudan on July 9
th
 2011, is now a sovereign nation. The new 
relationship between North and South –now two sovereign nations- could potentially play a part 
in how America and other nations deal with the NCP. 
Could the violation the South’s sovereignty by the NCP trigger a stronger American 
response in Sudan? America’s waning power in the world, coupled with the United States 
support of the CPA, might incite American policy makers to act and halt a violation of the 
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South’s sovereignty.  However, several factors make this scenario unlikely. First, al-Bashir can 
preserve his chief policy objectives without a “major” violation of South Sudan’s sovereignty. 
Strategically Darfur and the Nuba Mountains are a priority.  Reeling in opposition to the NCP in 
these regions will take the bulk of Khartoum’s resources and attention. Even if the NCP had a 
free hand and was able to launch a full scale invasion of South, success (as the previous two 
decades have shown) would be highly unlikely.  Additionally, the NCP’s objectives in the South 
have always been the strategic border areas that lie between the two regions –now two 
independent nations. Initially the border areas were sought by Khartoum –largely through its 
proxy wars- for transition to its commercial farming schemes. Presently the focus is more on the 
oil-rich regions, especially Abyei, an area -even after the 2011 referendum for independence- 
that al-Bashir refuses to relinquish.  Secondly, after decades of dancing around American 
sanctions and policy initiatives al-Bashir is savvy enough to realize that NCP’s transgressions 
along these border regions are not likely to provoke an American response. In fact, after two 
decades of human rights violations and transgressions in this region, followed by a non-response 
by the United States, al-Bashir can feel confident that anything short of a full scale invasion of 
the South will go unpunished.  
Since the South’s July independence many problems with the peace process that were 
pointed out in this thesis continue. For example, the American supported Comprehensive Peace 
Agreement dealt solely with the SPLA/SPLM, ignoring the ethnic diversity in the South, as well 
as its disparate rebel groups. In the first week of July, days before independence, thousands in 
South Sudan have died in tribal and rebel violence, much of this coming in conflict with SPLA 
forces.  In addition, South Sudan’s government has accused the NCP of arming rebels in an 
effort to undermine the South.
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 Much value should be attached to this claim as the North for 
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decades has sought to exploit the divisions in the South and more recently in Darfur. More 
alarming was the recent move on May 22, 2011 by the NCP to seize the disputed border area 
between North and South. The seizure of Abyei (the oil rich region) often called Sudan’s 
“Kashmir”, was, according to the North, in response to an SPLA attack of Northern troops who 
were being escorted by the UN peacekeepers.
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  The seizure of Abyei was followed by 
escalating violence and recriminations from both sides as thousands have fled the area. The 
escalation of violence in the region, and the NCP decision to seize Abyei, which is in violation of 
the CPA, magnifies the lack of peace keepers or international presence in the region. Critics, 
including U.S. Special Envoy to Sudan Princeton Lyman, argue the NCP seizure of Abyei was 
“disproportionate and irresponsible.”176 John Prendergast, Sudanese scholar and co-founder of 
the Enough Project, an advocacy group, commented, “If there is no cost to the Khartoum 
regime’s commission of atrocities and to the dishonoring of agreements, then why would 
anything change in Sudan?”177  It appears that the NCP continues business as usual. The 
American response has continued to be cautious, as the government has done little more than 
discuss sanctions on the NCP.  While the recent violence has not elicited a greater American 
response, prospects for change could rest on Africa’s own organizations.  
While several non-Western nations, most notably China, have grown economically and 
militarily, these nations, for better or worse have not embraced the liberal principles of 
democracy, and human rights now embedded in the idea of  globalization.  Most of these non-
Western nations also, absent enough media pressure and public sentiment for change, have little 
impetus to change the way they do business in Sudan. China’s ascendancy in the twenty- first 
century, coupled with its established connections to Sudanese oil, Khartoum’s cash cow, would 
be in a position to evoke change, but has failed to do so. While its intervention  might be the best 
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hope for change, China with its own history of separatist movements, as well as the contentious 
issue of Taiwan’s future still undecided, it remains highly unlikely that China will support any 
move in Sudan that Beijing feels might paint Khartoum’s sovereign government in a negative 
light. The latter elements coupled with China’s severe restrictions on personal liberties, as well 
as its lack of free and open media, ensure that Beijing receives little pressure to alter its 
economic partnership with Khartoum. Moreover, China’s involvement in Sudan’s economic 
development will likely act to further dull the effect of any U.S. sanctions on Khartoum.  
One hope, especially in wake of Africa’s colonial past and the failure of Western 
humanitarianism is that organizations provided by Africans will heal the wounds that trouble that 
continent.   In fact, succumbing to many of the same global pressures and changes (post- Cold 
War) the Organization of African Unity (OAU), has attempted to evolve not only its name –now 
the African Union (AU) – but also its approach to dealing with contemporary issues.   
 The OAU (upon its inception in 1963) largely was concerned with the integrity of the 
newly formed African Nations. The organization viewed colonialism or neo-colonialism as its 
primary concern, but also had to be concerned with the internal strife endemic to nation building 
in Africa.  However, while the right to self-determination served African leaders well and was 
trumpeted loudly in their fight against European colonialism, post- independence, these same 
leaders, fearing both for the stability of Africa’s fragile new nations, as well as neo-colonialism, 
viewed the principle with more reservation and even hostility.   Therefore, while the dynamics 
are different, both western actors and African have protected and supported the sacred right of 
sovereignty.  This tendency has been a major challenge to a more energetic response in Sudan.   
Although the concerns of African leaders have been legitimate, the determination to keep 
the map as it was, coupled with the political nature of the OAU and the weaknesses imbedded in 
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that organization, have set a pattern of ineffectiveness in response to internal strife and African 
despotism. Much like the UN, the OAU is administered and funded by the same state actors with 
which the organization must interact. Often its leaders, beset by their own state’s economic 
failings, as well as fearing a consideration of their own government’s shortcomings, have failed 
to act forcefully when it comes to inter-African conflicts or crises. Rajen Harshe, author of 
“Reflections on Organization of African Unity,” referring to that lack of response to communal 
violence in Sudan, laments, “The OAU watched these ghastly spectacles by using principle of 
‘non-interference’ as a convenient excuse”. 178  As the geopolitical landscape continues to shift 
post-Cold War, the inability of the OAU to act unfortunately has coincided with worsening 
economic and inter-state conditions in Africa, further compounding the crisis.   
 While fostering the continent’s own economic growth has become a primary goal of the 
AU leading up to its official inception in the new millennium, so too was addressing Africa’s 
human rights issues and the  growing displacement crisis. Integral to fixing the latter problems is 
a new view of the former slavish reliance on state sovereignty. For example, several objectives 
of the new organization were cited as, “the promotion of good governance, social justice, gender 
equality, and good health.” The new charter did reaffirm “defense of sovereignty, territorial 
integrity, and independence of member states” but did provide for the “right of the Union to 
intervene in a Member State Pursuant to a decision of the Assembly with respect to grave 
circumstances, namely: war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity.”179 Additionally, 
peace keeping, mediation, and sanctions were cited as circumstances in which intervention was 
warranted.  The current African Mission in Sudan (AMIS) is deployed under this very provision.  
The above changes now embedded in the AU seemed to provide a legal and moral 
impetus to do more. The move in Africa corresponded with the international push (post- Cold 
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War) toward eroding the principle of sacred sovereignty, which more and more was viewed 
internationally as an anachronism. In addition, the very recent July 9
th
 2011 Independence of the 
Republic of South Sudan removes the barrier.   In short, the continued atrocities committed by 
governments against their own citizens provided the moral and legal imperative to intervene for 
humanitarian reasons.   Scholars, historians and legal experts have concentrated on providing an 
international precedent or legal justification for this paradigm shift.   
Judy Mayotte, author of “Civil War in Sudan: The Paradox of Human Rights and 
National Sovereignty” claims that in 1991, the UN, the United States, and European leaders 
established a precedent, based on international law, justifying intervention in certain situations. 
In brief, international leaders because of the imminent threat to the Shi’ite and Kurd populations 
were compelled to act because of humanitarian considerations.  While in the past, a much 
narrower interpretation of the UN Charter essentially forbid the UN from intervening in domestic 
matters, in April of 1991, intervention was justified and implemented under UN Security Council 
Resolution 688. Mayotte points out that, the resolution “for the first time in history determined 
that humanitarian suffering within a given member state was a threat to international peace and 
security.”180  The latter concept was based on statutes of the 1948 Convention on the Prevention 
and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide. President George Bush Sr. used that prevailing 
temperament and legal precedent to justify American military action during the Gulf War in 
1991.  
Scholars often treat foreign policy in a similar fashion; they seek remedies to improve 
existing international law or to underscore legal precedent(s) as a basis for policy or intervention. 
Mayotte uses President Bush’s 1991 Iraq intervention, along with the transgressions of GOS, as a 
basis for Sudanese intervention. Additionally, Cohen and Deng, authors of Masses in Flight, 
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create a concise and reasoned overview of both the strengths and weaknesses of current 
international law, particularly as that law applies to IDPs. The authors view the failings of 
international response to internal crises largely as a legal quandary. However, the failing of these 
scholarly works is that they are just that –scholarly works. Foreign Policy is enacted not in an 
esoteric vacuum of academia, but within the real world of active geo-politics. Policy is 
principally driven, not by humanitarian concerns, but the political whims or will of different 
nations. Both the United States and the AU are strongly guided by political motivations. And 
while the United States has acted in accordance with international law, it has also chosen to 
ignore both international law and the opinion of its Western allies when it serves its own 
purposes.  A precedent for intervention for “humanitarian purposes” or to act  against “rogue 
regimes”  has already been set both with international backing and without; a further alteration or 
an adjustment to international law to fit Sudan’s internal crisis is not a guarantee that more 
aggressive action will ever be taken.    
Viable and effective cooperation by the AU, UN, and the United States to halt the crisis 
in Sudan may remain a fantasy. Although the inception of the AU did bring with it a more 
cohesive economic plan, its lofty expectations for humanitarian endeavors remain captive to 
politics, as well as a legacy of inaction. In part, the issue still lies within the structure of the AU, 
which requires a vote by a Union Assembly to proceed, further politicizing and weakening that 
organization.  In spite of credible evidence that the situation in Darfur has met the definition of 
grave circumstances (war crimes and crimes against humanity) the AU has decided to proceed 
with mediation and a small observer force rather than evoke Article 4h. That Article, if voted 
affirmatively, could trigger intervention.   In fact, “the closest the AU Assembly has come to 
singling out the perpetrators of the mass killing is its condemnation of ceasefire violations by all 
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parties.”181 Despite GOS’s continued misbehavior and refusals to comply with the CPA, the AU 
has continued to respect Sudan’s sovereignty. Additionally, in the face of Sudan’s atrocious 
human rights record, the AU has scoffed at indictments handed down against President Bashir 
from the International Criminal Court and even seriously considered Sudan’s bid to become 
Chair of the Union in 2006. The bid was eventually denied, but as bargaining chip it was agreed 
Sudan and Bashir could take the seat in 2007. While Sudan never took the seat, the fact that it 
was considered, and two consecutive Chairs, which included Congo’s President Sassou-Nguesso 
in 2006, were  handed to leaders that came to power in a coup d’état speaks volumes for the 
extreme political nature that still has steered the course of African organizations.  
United States policy in Sudan is also unlikely to develop or evolve into a more robust 
response in Sudan. Once more, currently there are at least 4 million IDPs in Sudan, many of 
these individuals dispossessed as a result of Khartoum’s illegal policies. American initiatives, 
sanctions and humanitarian efforts in response to the war in Sudan have been initiated more from 
a moral and public relations impulse to do something, anything, but, to act without getting the 
United States involved militarily, fiscally, or in committing large numbers of personnel.  Again, 
al-Bashir is savvy enough to gauge American intent.   
While the conflict and humanitarian crisis were met with apathy, American policy when 
in response to a terrorist threat – a top geo-political concern- produced a more robust action or 
the threat of action from the United States. President Clinton in 1996 suspended diplomatic 
relations with Khartoum triggering the expulsion of bin-Laden from Sudan in that same year. 
Two years later in August of 1998, the ground work already laid by bin-Laden, al- Qaeda 
attacked American embassies in Kenya and Tanzania provoking President Clinton to launch a 
cruise missile attack on an alleged chemical plant in Sudan. Additionally, months before 9-11 
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and under pressure from the Bush Administration, al-Bashir, albeit with his own agenda, arrested 
Hussein Turabi bin Laden’s former host and mentor.   In the aftermath of 9-11 American resolve 
and intent has been easy to gauge; consequently al-Bashir has been almost obsequious in his 
desire to meet American demands, even granting the United States access to the Sudanese secret 
service. In short, al-Bashir is easily able to guess when America means business with its foreign 
policy and act accordingly.  
The current economic recession, the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, their unpopularity 
with much of the public, the history of inaction in Africa, as well as the cooperation that exists 
on the Terror front between Washington and Khartoum, make the United States current foreign 
policy path likely to continue in the region. In 2007, U.S. State Department’s senior envoy to 
Sudan, said a regime change was “furthest from our mind.”  He added further that the United 
States would likely announce new sanctions. 
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  With China, and other nations imbedded 
economically in Sudan, and without a stronger AU response, sanctions, which have been par for 
the course, will be unlikely to evoke a greater change in the NCP’s behavior or policies.  
The best hope moving forward is that the United States engages Sudan –not just the 
NCP- but the SPLA/M and the myriad rebel groups with diplomatic attention commensurate 
with the crisis and number of people affected.  Sadly, while the United States Congress has had 
countless hearings on the crisis, and has listened to testimony of scores of experts, victims, and 
scholars, making it an informed body, the American public has only received sporadic and 
cursory information. An “informed” American public could provide the necessary pressure on 
Congress to do more.  
The influence of the media on the American public can be difficult to gage. Scholars 
debate the exact influence the media holds; opinions range from the “CNN Effect”, a belief that 
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the media can play a significant role in foreign policy decision making, to a belief that its role is 
largely overstated. Although its influence is open to debate, it is clear that the American media 
has taken a particular position on the Sudanese crisis.  
Robert Rotberg and Thomas G. Weiss, authors of From Massacres to Genocide: The 
Media, Public Policy, and Humanitarian Crises, explain that the media has helped to paint an 
image of crisis and response within the perimeters of “victim and rescuer.” 183  Ironically, while 
public interest in the Sudanese crisis could potentially provide the impetus for more effective 
policy, it has in the past only acted to buttress the limited aims of the United States. Media 
coverage in the past decade of Darfur and in previous decades of the civil war was limited, 
appealing more to a humanitarian impulse than a true call for diplomatic response.  Darfur was 
labeled by President Bush and covered by the media as an act of genocide. In previous decades, 
the face of the Sudanese conflict, the “Lost Boys”, were presented as refugees chased and driven 
from their homes. Both garnered a general response from political interest groups, NGOs, and 
Christian groups which gave rise to increased humanitarianism, essentially an offering to the 
“victims”. However, what was needed was a call for more diplomatic attention and resources in 
the region.   
Congress has acknowledged as recently as 2007 that “humanitarianism was too often 
stressed” at the expense of serious diplomacy between American, its allies, Africa, and UN184.   
Although presently the American public is ill informed of the negative effects of humanitarian 
endeavors, or the true policy measures it so often replaces, more and more scholars have taken 
up the banner; some even advocating a “sitting on the sideline approach”, absent true diplomacy.  
While it is hard to imagine the academic insight associated with humanitarian endeavors and 
their impact on diplomacy would become general knowledge overnight, public awareness could 
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continue to grow slowly. Additionally, there is a growing awareness on college campuses and 
amongst Christian groups that increasingly have called for more robust American responses in 
Sudan. If these voices continue to grow, once in the public mainstream it could serve to influence 
elections and public policy.  
The United States could immediately step up its commitment to sending more peace 
keepers to enforce the Darfur peace and the CPA. Khartoum has responded when it feels it is 
truly being pressured, or its position is at stake. While even a fairly large surge in American 
peace keepers would not correct the underlying political issues in Sudan, or change the inherent 
ills of the NCP, it could at least give the CPA or the peace in the border areas between the two 
nations a chance.   Additionally, a larger American response could prove to promote more 
forceful AU initiatives.  Although perhaps the least unsavory of outcomes, an American peace 
keeper injured or killed in Sudan could spark public outrage in America and inspire a stronger 
stance in regard to the NCP.  
As delineated in this thesis the CPA is not a cure-all for the ills of North or South Sudan. 
However, the United States made a commitment to the people of Sudan when it pushed forward 
the peace process. Khartoum’s decision to not honor or uphold the results of the Abyei Border 
Commission (ABC) has essentially broken the agreements made in the CPA. Abyei should 
become a cross roads in American policy. While the United States has more often tied geo-
political importance to military and economic concerns, human suffering and America’s 
commitment to upholding the CPA should take precedence.  The decision to go forward with a 
more robust response over Abyei could take several forms and have several positive outcomes in 
the long-term.  
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First, a scenario in which America buttresses a UNMIS peace keeping force to observe 
that the Abyei borders were upheld would send a message to the NCP that the United States is 
committed to upholding the CPA and the sovereignty of South Sudan. Al-Bashir has typically 
responded to American pressure when U.S. intentions and priorities were clear.  An American 
presence would also give confidence to the people of South Sudan that it can commit its 
resources and energies, especially along the border, to creating a nation built on a foundation 
other than war. Additionally, while the above circumstances would not directly help the 
marginalized people of the North, it would set a precedent (led by America) in which a strong 
challenge to the NCP’s policies could evoke political change in the North. As previously stated, 
the NCP is a regime that does not garner support from the majority of its citizens.  
 Lastly, if the NCP continued to violate the sanctity of Abyei the United States could 
respond militarily. Visualizing American ground forces stuck in a quagmire fighting for Abyei is 
difficult, but there are other options. Since Khartoum has used its government troops to launch 
attacks into Abyei the United States could identify targets and use air strikes. Air-strikes in the 
former Yugoslavia, while not necessarily achieving an immediate humanitarian need, did force 
Serb forces to stop their offensive actions. Strikes of this nature could also halt the NCP and 
uphold the borders. Again, historically U.S. policy has been has transparent.—American 
intentions have easily been read by Khartoum. While successive administrations stated their goal 
was to end the war, America clearly did not give credence to this goal by its actions. The NCP’s 
objective has always been, first and foremost, to keep its power and position in Khartoum. A 
military confrontation with the United States could galvanize the Sudanese people around al-
Bashir, but this is unlikely. The more likely effect would be for al-Bashir (fearing to lose his 
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tenuous grip on power) to pull back from his demands in Abyei. American resolve, as shown in 
America’s war on terror, has achieved results in Sudan.    
However, with the United States heavily invested in Iraq and Afghanistan, and memories 
of the Somalia fiasco fresh, an American military intervention in Sudan is unlikely, but perhaps 
the surge of negative attention directed at the NCP could foster confidence and eventual change 
generated from within Sudan itself.  While the civil war and the Darfur conflict have often been 
simplified down racial, religious and ethnic lines, the inherent injustice, and the impetus behind 
these conflicts, continues to be the lack of power sharing with Sudan.  The world has witnessed 
in Egypt, Libya, and other Middle Eastern nations grass roots movements that have toppled or 
threatened to topple despotic regimes. If further rebellion was to occur in Sudan, threatening the 
NCP, it would be interesting to see what response the United States would take. Would the 
United States judge, based on the fall of the NCP, and the possible instability to follow, that its 
main geo-political interests –clearly the war on terrorism- would become threatened? Or could 
this mean a new period of true democracy and secularism in Sudan that could give rise to a new 
era of diplomacy between Sudan and the United States?         
While a humanitarian agenda is unlikely to bring a long term resolution to the crisis in 
Sudan, the United States could make a difference in the lives of many more Sudanese by 
addressing its asylum policy. The United States by 2007 had offered only 3 Darfurian refugees in 
the United States!
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  Protecting America’s borders is still a priority, but clearly there is a 
compelling need for a revision of the U.S. Patriot Act of 2001 and the REAL ID Act of 2005. 
America for centuries provided opportunities for those suffering against various forms of 
despotism.  Asylum policies need to be drawn, not around broad brush strokes, but with care to 
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individual needs and a case by case criterion; while it may be more expensive and politically 
precarious, the suffering that continues in Sudan and South Sudan make it necessary.   
However, if a stronger U.S. response (either politically or militarily) is to come in Sudan, 
the opportunity most likely will present itself with a change in America’s overall geo-political 
position in the world. After 9-11 a paradigm shift did occur, but as previously stated, it only 
worked to further degrade the importance of the Sudanese crisis, at the expense of intelligence 
gathering in the region.  In the foreseeable future the “War on Terror” will continue to evolve as 
will America’s relationships with the NCP. While Khartoum currently provides a “service” to 
Washington, this benefit at some point may not outweigh the unrest in the region caused by the 
NCP’s transgressions and poor governance.       
More likely than not America’s position and influence in the world will continue to 
decline relative to the strength of up and coming global rivals. While difficult to predict, China’s 
growing economic strength worldwide, and in Africa, will perhaps, in the eyes of Washington, 
give rise to a new level of diplomatic interest in Sudan. The ebbs and flows of geo-politics, not a 
moral imperative, typically give rise to action or foreign policy initiatives.  Perhaps its evolving 
position in the world may finally serve to wake American indifference toward the crisis in 
Sudan.  
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